Walden University

ScholarWorks
Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies

Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies
Collection

2021

Predictive Applications of Debarment List in Public Procurement
Nester Oluwafemi Komolafe
Walden University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations
Part of the Public Administration Commons, and the Public Policy Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies
Collection at ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact ScholarWorks@waldenu.edu.

Walden University
College of Social and Behavioral Sciences

This is to certify that the doctoral dissertation by

Nester Oluwafemi Komolafe

has been found to be complete and satisfactory in all respects,
and that any and all revisions required by
the review committee have been made.

Review Committee
Dr. Mary Bruce, Committee Chairperson,
Public Policy and Administration Faculty
Dr. Lori Demeter, Committee Member,
Public Policy and Administration Faculty
Dr. Kristie Roberts Lewis, University Reviewer,
Public Policy and Administration Faculty

Chief Academic Officer and Provost
Sue Subocz, Ph.D.

Walden University
2020

Abstract
Predictive Applications of Debarment List in Public Procurement
by
Nester Oluwafemi Komolafe

MPhil., Walden University, 2020
MPA, University of Illinois at Springfield, 2016
MA, University of Illinois at Springfield, 2014
MA, Webster University, 2006
BSc., University of Lagos, 1991

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Public Policy and Administration

Walden University
December 2020

Abstract
Predictive applications of a debarment list involve gathering historical data in the list to
capture the relationships between the relevant variables in the data to predict the most
likely future outcomes. Exploring whether the data in the debarment list could produce
predictive analytics, which agencies may use to deter contractors from committing fraud,
is unknown. This study closed the literature gap through a quantitative nonexperimental
analysis of secondary data, inspired by real-life administrative decisions. The purpose of
this study was to analyze the City of Chicago’s debarment list to determine the statistical
probability of business entities that may be debarred from receiving contract awards from
the City. The study’s theoretical foundation was predicated on deterrence theory, with a
conceptual framework that offered a practical explanation of the dynamics of the
debarment deterrence sanction system. The number of debarred contractors sampled from
the City’s debarment list in the fiscal year 2008 to 2019 was N = 138. Results of binomial
logistic regression showed that procurement fraud is 50.7% as likely as to cause a firm
debarred from receiving contracts from the City compared with an individual. However,
procurement fraud is 72.60% as likely as to cause the City to debar an individual from
receiving City contracts compared with a firm. The model showed that phony company
fraud is 21.3 times more likely than contract fraud to trigger a firm’s debarment. The
predictions in this study have social implications for strengthening the use of debarment
for fraud prevention, public advocacy, and better public funds management and positive
social change.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
A debarment list is an essential and highly sought-after exclusion record. Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR, 2014) requires federal government agencies to compile the
debarment list of debarred individuals or firms on the web-based System for Award
Management (SAM) exclusion records maintained by General Services Administration
(GSA). Also, government agencies are required to check the debarment list to avoid
unintentionally soliciting offers from, or awarding contracts to, contractors on the list
(FAR, 9.404 (c)(5)). In debarment practices, the debarment list has gained contractors’
attention: it serves as a deterrent resource, which government contractors can perceive as
a source of sanction threat that can affect their present integrity and loss of business
opportunities with public agencies at all levels of government. A contractor listed in the
debarment list is automatically disqualified from receiving contract awards from the
government for a specified period (Levy & Wagner, 2018).
In this study, I explored the extent to which the variables of contractor location,
debarment fraud and length of debarment are associated with the probability of getting a
business entity excluded from receiving contract awards from the City of Chicago. No
previous studies examined whether the data in a debarment list have predictive
capabilities. The study showed that the ability to deter public procurement fraud might be
subject to the predictive capability of relevant fraud data in a debarment list. This study
provides scholarly knowledge on the statistical information that may enable procurement
leaders and policymakers to utilize the debarment list to improve debarment practices.
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The organization of this study is as follows: Chapter 1 introduces the study’s
background with further emphasis on the research problem, research question, purpose of
study, and the other contexts that guide the study. Chapter 2, the literature review,
explicates current studies on debarment practices related explicitly to the debarment list.
It also provides scholarly information on deterrence theory, which formed the theoretical
foundation of the study. Chapter 3 provides the overall methodological approach for the
study, including the use of the research design, collection of data, and data analysis plan
to advance the purpose statement and research question of the study. Chapter 4 presents
clarity of statistical analysis and predictive modeling results obtained from binomial
logistic regression analyses. The chapter also provides step-by-step modeling techniques
that are particularly relevant to the study; the hypotheses were tested, and the research
question answered. In Chapter 5, I interpret the results of the findings, focusing on the
variables of interest in the study. In this concluding chapter, I discuss the limitations and
implications of the study and offer policy recommendations, some of which invite a
paradigm shift to adopt artificial intelligence techniques to enhance predictive
applications of debarment list in public procurement.
Background of the Study
An ancient moral law established that: “You shall not steal, nor deal falsely, nor
lie to one another” (Leviticus 19:11, NKJV). The acts of fraudulent misconduct, which
includes but is not limited to stealing, cheating, robbery, false claims, and wage fraud,
have been part of human existence in many human endeavors (Exodus 20:15-17;
Leviticus 19:13). As it was in the old times, so it is in public procurement in these
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modern times. Extant studies have confirmed that public procurement fraud and corrupt
practices perpetrated by unscrupulous contractors are still prevalent (Achua, 2011;
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2018; Miranzo, 2017; Rose-Ackerman &
Palifka, 2016; Rustiarini, Nurkholis, & Andayani, 2019; Schuchter & Levi, 2016; The
Project on Government Oversight, 2019; Transparency International, 2014; Trepte,
2005). Procurement fraud has led to wasteful use of taxpayers’ money (Brink, 2013;
Guile, 2010; Mogner & Chene, 2014; Tracy & White, 2011).
Public procurement fraud is a widespread phenomenon; it is evident at the global,
national, and local government levels. For example, at the global level, Spruill (2014)
reported that an estimated average of $9.5 trillion is spent globally on public contracts,
out of which Transparency International (2014) estimated at least $2 trillion would
“disappear from annual procurement budgets” (p. 8). At the national level, total
procurement fraud settlements and judgments in the United States between 2009 and
2015 were estimated at $4 billion (Barger & Walthall, 2016). Federal spending on
purchasing of goods and services during the 2019 fiscal year accounted for about $4.4
trillion (USAspending.gov, 2019). Procurement in the government sector is enormous
and complex, and government agencies spend taxpayers’ money to buy goods and
services to fulfill its obligations and optimize public welfare (Cibinc & Nash, 1986; U.S.
Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2011). At the local government level,
Quarterly Reports from 2015 through 2019 published by the Office of Inspector General
(OIG) at the City of Chicago showed that procurement fraud perpetrated by the City’s
contractors had become part of the drivers for economic loss for the City in terms of costs
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of fraud. For easy reference in this study, the word “City” may be used to denote the City
of Chicago.
The nature of corruption in government procurement is complex (WilliamsElegbe, 2012) and difficult to detect (Wang, 2016) because fraudulent contractors can
defraud the government at any stage of the procurement activities (Caulfield, 2014;
Green, 2013). Taxpayers’ money ought to be protected and directed to fund procurement
of goods and services for the common good of the people (Peltier-Rivest, 2018; Pieth,
2005; Schultz, 2004; Tracy & White, 2011). To protect the interests of U.S. government,
FAR (2014) requires government agencies to request bids from or award contracts to
contractors that are only presently responsible [(16 48 C.F.R. § 9.402(a)]. The U.S.
government is currently using debarment and suspension as one of the fraud-preventive
programs to protect itself from procurement fraud, waste, and abuse (GSA, 2019). A
debarment and suspension initiative to protect the government interests is through the
debarment list. FAR (2014) has prescribed that agencies should compile the debarment
list of debarred contractors. As such, a contractor listed in the debarment list cannot
receive contracts from the government agencies for a fixed period. The debarment list is a
government repository that contains information about contractors determined to be
ineligible to receive contracts from the government (American Bar Association [ABA],
2018).
It is practically impossible for government agencies to plan and spend vast sums
of public funds to buy goods and services devoid of contractors’ procurement misconduct
such as corruption, waste, fraud, collusion, coercive, and abuse practices. Otherwise,
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there would be no need for debarment sanctions, and by extension, there would be no
need for keeping a debarment list. The government uses debarment and suspension as
statutory and discretionary tools to prevent public procurement fraud, waste, and abuse
(GSA, 2019). A suspension is a temporary remedy to disqualify a nonresponsible
contractor from receiving government contracts. At the same time, a debarment excludes
nonresponsible contractors from receiving government contracts for a fixed period after
debarment procedures (FAR, 2014). For simplicity in this study, suspension and
debarment generally will be denoted as “debarment.” Debarment sanction is a public
procurement regulation the U. S. government uses as the last resort to protect its interests
(Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee [ISDC], 2019).
Some government agencies’ response to prevent fraudulent and corrupt
procurement practices is exclusion action to debar contractors from partaking in
government procurement for a fixed time (Gordon, 2013; Tillipman, 2013). For example,
the U.S. government has implemented 10,982 debarments between Fiscal Year 2009 and
2017 (ISDC, 2019). A debarment is implemented in all three government levels in the
United States (Williams-Elegbe, 2012). At the municipal government level, the City of
Chicago’s debarment procedures mirror the federal government’s procedures. The City
applies a debarment sanction program to stop unscrupulous contractors, but the
debarment regime is still unable to stop procurement fraud (Komolafe, 2018). For
example, the City of Chicago recorded about 158 debarment actions between fiscal years
2008 and 2019 due to several frauds committed by the City’s contractors (City of
Chicago, 2020). It suffices to say that debarment at the federal or local government level
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can only end a contractor’s business with the government but may not necessarily end
public procurement frauds. The debarment sanction system has received a great deal of
attention from public procurement scholars (Auriol & Søreide, 2017; Williams-Elegbe,
2015), lawyers (Levy & Wagner, 2018; Yukins, 2013), policymakers (Cibinc & Nash,
1986), government organizations (GAO, 2011; GSA, 2019) and international
organizations (Transparency International 2014; The World Bank Group, 2016). Current
research recognizes that debarment practices can effectively deter contractors from
committing fraud (Cerrone, Hermstrüwer, & Robalo, 2018; Whisler & Churchill, 2017).
Nevertheless, no research has specifically focused on the predictive applications of the
debarment list; this is a gap in the literature on debarment practices. The debarment list is
an essential list that government agencies must check before awarding contracts to
contractors (FAR, 2014; 31 U.S.C. § 6101). What is unknown is whether the data in a
debarment list have predictive capabilities; this was the focus of the study.
In this study, I addressed the literature gap by presenting new knowledge about
the important link between the predictive relevance of a debarment list and the
effectiveness of debarment deterrence on government contractors. To achieve this goal, I
analyzed the City of Chicago’s debarment data to produce predictive analytics. Public
organizations need the capability to analyze exclusion records to make actionable
predictions that can improve debarment practices (Wang, 2016). With the understanding
of the literature gap on the predictive capability of an agency’s debarment list, I chose a
quantitative approach to analyze the Debarred City of Chicago Firms and Individuals.
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That is, the debarment list of the City of Chicago and show that statistical predictions are
possible from a debarment list.
Problem Statement
The relationship between a contractor’s location, debarment fraud, the length of
debarment, and business entity in a government debarment list is not clearly understood.
Several studies have used different concepts or techniques to focus extensively on
debarment practices as an emerging frontline tool to sanction public procurement fraud.
Auriol and Søreide (2017) used theoretical economic analysis to predict the effect of
deterrence on debarment. Cerrone et al. (2018) used game theory to conduct a study on
debarment predictions for collusive biddings in public procurement. Wang (2016) used a
combination of game theory, statistical methods, and support vector machine (SVM) to
analyze historical fraudulent DOD contractors’ data in the Federal Procurement Data
System to classify new data to detect procurement frauds. Gallego, Rivero, and Martinez
(2018) utilized machine-learning techniques to predict contract inefficiency and
malfeasance in Colombia’s e-procurement system. However, no author has specifically
addressed how public agencies can use their debarment lists to make statistical
predictions that may improve debarment practices. This literature gap is surprising
because the debarment list is a well-sought list, which government agencies must
maintain and check before awarding contracts to any contractor (FAR, 2014). What is
less well known in this literature gap but crucial to understand, is that the data in a
debarment list may have predictive capabilities.
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The general problem is that despite maintaining a debarment list, government
agencies continue to face the risks of contracting with fraudulent or criminal contractors
(Auriol & Søreide, 2017; Guile, 2010; McCue, Prier, & Swanson, 2015; Rendon &
Rendon, 2015; Tillipman, 2013). The specific problem is that public agencies are not
analyzing their debarment data enough (GAO, 2005, 2011) to gather predictive and
actionable statistical information to improve debarment practices (Søreide, Gröning, &
Wandall, 2016). The magnitude of these problems is that public agencies merely maintain
a debarment list to check for unqualified contractors and alert other agencies of
contractors that are ineligible to do business with the government (ISDC, 2017). As a
result, the debarment list is underutilized in many public agencies (Amey, 2013;
Schooner, 2004) and thus needs greater attention (GAO, 2011).
The critical gap in the current literature requires ample study on the debarment
list; understanding how the relationship between a contractor’s location, debarment fraud,
the length of debarment, and business entity in a government debarment list can offer
statistical predictions in public procurement. The problematic dearth of studies on
government agencies’ capacity to utilize a debarment list to make predictive analyses
should not continue. It is essential to minimize or curb procurement frauds in the public
sector; otherwise, as Tracy and White (2011) suggested, the funds agencies need to
provide services to the people may be depleted by the costs of fraud. It has become
imperative to conduct this quantitative study to analyze a government debarment list to
determine statistical predictions, which government agencies may utilize to optimize their
debarment practices and prevent public procurement fraud.
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Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this quantitative study was to examine the predictive relationship
of the effects of contractor location, debarment fraud, and length of debarment on
business entities listed in the debarment list that were debarred from receiving contract
awards from a municipal government in the State of Illinois. The independent variables
were contractor’s location with two location categories (Chicago and Other cities),
debarment fraud with two fraud categories (procurement and nonprocurement), and the
length of debarment. The dependent variable was busines entity with two business
registration types (firm and individual). The study analyzed the City of Chicago’s
debarment list to determine the statistical probability of firms or individuals that may be
debarred from the array of contractors doing business with the City.
Research Question and Hypotheses
The research question for the study is as follows: What predictive relationship, if
any, do the location of contractor, debarment fraud, and the length of debarment on
business entities (firms or individuals) listed in the debarment list have as to whether they
were debarred from receiving contract awards from the City of Chicago municipal
government in the State of Illinois?
Null hypothesis: The debarment fraud of a debarred contractor listed in the
debarment list of the City of Chicago will not be a significant predictor of business entity
when compared to the contractor’s location and the length of debarment.
Ho: µLocation = µFraud = µLength.
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Research hypothesis: The debarment fraud of a debarred contractor listed in the
debarment list of the City of Chicago will significantly increase the ability to predict
business entity when compared to the contractor’s location and the length of debarment.
Ha: µLocation ≠ µFraud ≠µLength.
Theoretical Foundation
The theoretical foundation is the blueprint that serves as a guide, support, and
structure of research (Grant & Osanloo, 2014). Deterrence theory is the theoretical
foundation that guided this study. Modern deterrence theory was rooted in the earlier
works of Beccaria’s (1986 [1764]) On Crimes and Punishment and Bentham’s (1988
[1789]) The Principles of Morals and Legislation. Deterrence theory emphasizes the
probability of a reduction or prevention of illegal or unethical acts through threats of legal
sanctions or penalties (Nagin, 2013; Paternoster, 2010; Tomlinson, 2016). According to
Tomlinson (2016), deterrence theory hinges on three assumptions: “clear message,
perception of sanction, and rational decision” (p. 33). Extant studies showed that
deterrence theory operates on three crucial tenets: certainty, celerity, and severity of
punishment (Maxwell & Gray, 2007; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001; Paternoster, 2010). The
rationale for the choice of deterrence theory is predicated on the assumption that
debarment sanction is a deterrence-oriented program that may prevent fraudulent
contractors from receiving government contracts (Roberts, 2010). Deterrence theory
offers a practical explanation of the dynamics of the debarment deterrence sanction
system.
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According to deterrence theory, debarment will exclude not presently responsible
contractors from receiving contracts from the government (specific deterrence) and
prevent would-be not presently responsible contractors from doing business with the
government (general deterrence). When a contractor is debarred following a violation or
crime that is certain, swift, and severe, a contractor is less likely to repeat the crime, and
the message is sent to other contractors showing the consequences of the commission of
the crime (Purpura, 2019). The study used these logical connections to basic deterrence
theory to explain the role of debarment sanction as a deterrence-focused program in
public contracting established by the government to protect itself from doing business
with unscrupulous contractors. Specifically, in the study, I weaved the tenets of
deterrence theory into the research design to explore the effects of the research variables
on deterrence debarment action.
Conceptual Framework
The debarment deterrence model (DDM) is the conceptual framework I developed
for the study. The model is a synthesis of the deterrence theory and debarment sanction
concepts gathered from the literature review. The three elements in the model are: (a) the
predictor variables, which are the length, fraud, and location; (b) debarment deterrence,
which is the notion that the debarment list may provide enough deterrence to keep
fraudulent contractors from engaging in business dealings with the government because
this list is a source of a threat that may portend a significant reputational risk on other
contractors (Peirone, 2018); and (c) the outcome variables, which are contractors who
registered to do business with the City as firm or individual. This model was used in this
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study to facilitate the understanding of the same variables in the debarment list, the
deterrence theory, and the way the theory and debarment list was operationalized for
predictive applications in this research.
Nature of the Study
The nature of this study is a nonexperimental quantitative method of secondary
data analysis. The study’s focus was to analyze the archival data in the debarment list of
the City of Chicago to provide statistical predictions that may help improve debarment
practices in public procurement. The secondary data analysis was used to examine the
predictor variables (i.e., contractor location, debarment fraud, and length of debarment).
It was also used to assess the extent to which these three predictor variables individually
and collectively predict the outcome variable (i.e., business entity). The choice of the
analysis of archival data is consistent with the argument of Chidlow, Ghauri, Yeniyurt,
and Cavusgil (2015), that archival data is suitable to investigate the relationship among
variables. Scholars agreed that secondary data analysis is appropriate when the data
consist of dependent and independent variables relevant to the research (MacInnes, 2017;
Vartanian, 2011). Hence the research design of secondary data analysis best served this
study.
Quantitative research measure variables and test relationships between variables
to reveal patterns that lend credence to existing theories (Leavy, 2017). The study’s
research design aligned with deterrence theory as an analytical lens to explain the
deterrence effect on the predictor variables in the public organization debarment process.
Statistical predictions estimate functional relationships that can provide outputs to a set of

13
inputs (McNabb, 2018; Wu & Coggeshall, 2013). The predictors variables were required
in this study to develop a model that could predict the most statistically probable
outcomes. I used binomial logistic regression as the statistical tool to build predictive
models as a function of predictors—to test the hypothesis and predict the answer to the
study’s research question. Scholars have agreed that binomial logistic regression analysis
is suitable to test, model, classify and predict events where the dependent variable is
categorical, whereas the independent variables can either be categorical or continuous
(Bryman & Bell, 2015; Frees, Derrig, & Meyers, 2014; Laerd Statistics, 2017, Osborne,
2015).
Definitions
Administrative agreement: Agreement between an agency and a contractor to
resolve a contractor’s present responsibility inquiry such that the terms and conditions of
the agreement will adequately protect government business interests without the
imposition of government debarment (Levy & Wagner, 2018).
Business entity: A business entity is also referred to as a contractor in this study.
A business entity is an individual or a firm registered to transact business with a
government agency (FAR, 2014).
City: A short term used to denote “The City of Chicago” (City of Chicago, 2020).
Contractor: An individual or firm that has entered into an agreement to provide
goods or services to a government agency (FAR, 2014).
Debarred: A contractor that is excluded from doing business with or receiving
government contracts is “debarred” (Levy & Wagner, 2018).
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Debarment: A sanction imposed by a public entity to exclude nonresponsible
contractors (firms and individuals) from participating in public procurements for a
specified period (Cerrone et al., 2018; Shaw & Totman, 2015).
Debarment fraud: A type of fraud that caused the debarment of a contractor who
egregiously violated procurement rules (City of Chicago, 2020).
Debarment list: The debarment list is a government repository that contains
information about contractors that are determined to be ineligible to receive contracts
from the government (Levy & Wagner, 2018).
Discretionary debarment: The debarring officer of the debarring agency applies
the agency’s discretions to determine whether the implementation of debarment measures
is appropriate to disqualify contractors who have committed certain offenses (WilliamsElegbe, 2012).
Exclusion: A general term that expresses either suspension, disqualifications,
blacklisting, or debarment of a contractor from government contracts (Williams-Elegbe,
2017)
Entity: An entity is a contractor that is either a person or organization who has a
legal right to do business with the government (Federal Acquisition Institute, 2013).
Exclusion parties list: A web-based online register of companies excluded from
the United States government’s procurement and nonprocurement activities (GSA, 2019)
Federal acquisition regulation: A body of regulations governing all contracting
and procurement activities of the federal agencies in the United States of America (GAO,
2011).
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Not presently responsible: This term means that debarment is not intended as a
punishment for past violations but relates directly and focuses only on the contractor’s
current state (Robins & Baker, 2015).
Rational decision: This means maximizing the satisfaction of the decider’s
preferences (Kogelmann & Gaus, 2017).
Statutory debarment: This is when government legislation or policy mandates
outright disqualification of contractors convicted or found guilty of committing specified
offenses; the debarring officer must implement this policy (Williams-Elegbe, 2012).
Suspension: A suspension is a temporary remedy to disqualify a nonresponsible
contractor from receiving federal contracts (GAO, 2012; Miller & Martin, 2006).
Assumptions
A central assumption in this study is the view that contractors should make
rational decisions. They have perceptions of the consequences of committing fraud if
they want to or continue to do business with the government. However, this assumption
may not be realistic in all situations because contractors are human beings who are
susceptible to erroneous perceptions. The predictive value of the rational choice
assumption may be diminished when the contractors did not choose rationally. For
example, a study by Chapman et al. (2010) reported that some offenders under the
influence of drugs might not make rational choices.
Rational decision is relevant to this study to understand some critical dynamics
about debarment deterrence. In this study, I presumed that debarment actions can deter
future violations to the extent that exclusion that is certain, swift, and severe would
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outweigh the reward a contractor obtained from committing a crime. This assumption is
consistent with the argument of Kogelmann and Gaus (2017) that rational choice of
human actions is necessary to get “predictive leverage in some contexts” (p. 232). Also, I
made the assumption in this study that the effective deterrence of a contractor is possible
through a combination of a contractor’s actions and a debarment sanction system. In
other words, the predictive advantage is that a contractor is assumed to make rational
decisions to avoid being listed in the debarment list and thus deterred by debarment
sanction.
Scope and Delimitations
Government debarment typically covers sanctions for both procurement and
nonprocurement violations (2 CFR § 180.970 (a)). The scope of this study focused
primarily on debarment for procurement fraud because the study is essentially germane to
procurement in the public sector. Debarment fraud in this study is a dichotomous
categorical variable (procurement fraud and nonprocurement fraud). I used my personal
experience as a certified public procurement scholar-practitioner to analyze the City’s
debarment list professionally to determine the debarment fraud that are either
procurement related or nonprocurement related. Nonprocurement related fraud was coded
as a lower numerical number. This coding method was appropriate to give a premium to
procurement fraud, which I designed to predict in the study.
The study was delimited to the research design of secondary data analysis of
government contractors listed in the City of Chicago’s debarment list. Only secondary
data was analyzed in this study. I did not design the study to survey opinions of debarred
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contractors but to examine the debarred contractors’ data and explore alternative ways to
utilize a debarment list in public procurement. Another delimitation of this study is the
potential generalizability of how the study could use the City of Chicago, a municipal
government, to generalize for other government levels. I used the data in the City of
Chicago’s debarment list as a sample to generalize that the data in the debarment list of
other agencies are similar. Also, this study represented a generalization by replicating the
study’s results of predictive applications of the debarment list in a municipal government
in other government jurisdictions. By making generalizations that explain how debarment
concepts are interrelated in other government agencies, the study finds support from Yin
(2016), who argued that it is possible to use a holistic and exhaustive analysis of a case
study to generalize for other similar settings.
Limitations
One of the study’s limitations was that I did not have control on the debarment list
as a researcher because the data in the debarment list was the outcome of the City of
Chicago’s official decisions when the data was originally created. More importantly, the
public gets to know about documented evidence of public procurement fraud only when
the violating contractor is listed in the debarment list. Another limitation was that the
City may not have established its debarment list for research purposes. I did not have to
deal with the measures and recency of the City’s actions when I retrieved and analyzed
this data. However, my research was an attempt to use the City of Chicago’s the
debarment list to answer the research question of this study and demonstrate that the
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ability to deter public procurement fraud may be subject to the predictive capability of a
debarment list.
Significance of the Study
Public agencies maintain a debarment list, which debarment officials do not have
time to analyze (POGO, 2002), especially for prediction purposes. This study was an
attempt to fill the literature gap that has not addressed the predictive capabilities of the
debarment list. Doing so, I explored how government agencies can analyze debarment
data for predictive analytics that may improve debarment practices. The result of this
study’s findings might provide broad social implications to enhance legislation and
applicability to empower policymakers to formulate policies that can elucidate better use
of the debarment list. The study could also improve public procurement effectiveness and
efficiency for the public good and tackle social challenges like procurement fraud, waste,
and abuse in public organizations. Statistical predictions from this study may provide
government agencies a better understanding of how its current contractors may apply best
business practices to conduct business with the government responsibly. The study will
benefit procurement leadership in public organizations to have a straightforward way to
make decisions on how to utilize the debarment list effectively. This study is unique and
the first to lead to a direction to future scholarly research because it focused on how
agencies can derive statistical predictions from a debarment list. It could offer insights
into debarment regimes that may provide efficient and practical deterrent solutions strong
enough to minimize public procurement on waste use of taxpayers’ dollars. The study’s
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significance is consistent with GAO’s (2011) report, which showed that government
oversight was needed to improve debarment practices.
Summary and Transition
This study examined the predictive capabilities of the debarment list of the City of
Chicago. Chapter 1 provided an overview of the research problem the study sought to
address and its contexts. It also established the need for the research and introduces the
frame of reference that guides it, such as the background, purpose, and research question.
The chapter included the theoretical and conceptual framework that guided the study and
known scope, delimitation, and limitation of the study. I then presented the significance
of the study to public policymakers and scholars as well as the study’s potential influence
on social change in enhancing public procurement effectiveness and efficiency for the
public good and tackling social challenges like procurement fraud, waste, and abuse in
public organizations.
In Chapter 2, the literature review, I utilize an integrative and historical literature
review approach to discuss current studies on debarment practices that are specifically
related to the debarment list. I also explicate the application of deterrence theory on the
debarment list.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
The literature review for this research focused on studies that have been
conducted relative to exclusion records and debarment practices in public procurement.
This literature review aimed to integrate previous research outcomes related to specific
issues on the debarment list pertinent to this research question: What predictive
relationship, if any, do location of a contractor, debarment fraud, and the length of
debarment on business entities on a debarment list have as to whether they were debarred
from receiving contract awards from the City of Chicago municipal government in the
State of Illinois? The approach to the literature review was both historical and integrative.
The historical review approach examines the history of the evolution of concepts and
issues in a research topic (American Educational Research Association, 2018). The
review situated government debarment systems in historical contexts to frame an
understanding of the problems in the evolution of the debarment list. The integrative
review approach considers syntheses and critiques of a research topic (Fink, 2014;
Torracro, 2016). I reviewed relevant literature on the debarment system to generate a new
perspective on the predictive applications of the debarment list in scholarly research and
to give direction for future research.
Current research on debarment practices recognizes that the debarment sanction
system can be used as an effective deterrent to contractors that are willing to receive
contract awards from the government (Auriol & Søreide, 2017; Cerrone et al., 2018;
Moran, Pope, & Doig, 2004; Whisler & Churchill, 2017; Williams-Elegbe, 2019).
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However, it is a problem that government agencies are susceptible to procurement frauds
despite debarment remedies (Rendon & Rendon, 2016; Auriol & Søreide, 2017). This
study focused on the analysis of the debarment list of the City of Chicago. It examined
the predictive relationship of the effects of contractor location, debarment fraud, and
length of debarment on business entities that were debarred from doing business with the
City. Doing business with fraudulent contractors could mean wasteful use of taxpayers’
dollars and losses for recipients of government program services (Brink, 2013; Tracy &
White, 2011). The Department of Procurement Services at the City of Chicago needs
predictive capabilities to support the City’s efforts to prevent or deter procurement fraud.
After extensive searches in different databases, search results showed that the literature
on debarment practices is vast, but there is no specific peer-reviewed literature on the
debarment list. However, there are minimal government reports related to issues on the
debarment list yet with no information on a debarment list’s predictive application.
This chapter includes discussion of (a) literature search strategy, (b) theoretical
foundation – deterrence theory, (c) conceptual framework – debarment deterrence model,
(d) debarment sanction system – definition, functions and effect of debarment list,
evolution and history of debarment list in public contracting, and debarment regulation,
(e) the City of Chicago debarment system, and (f) predictor and outcome variables location of contractor, debarment fraud and length of debarment, and firm and individual
as outcome variables. I used deterrence theory to explain debarment sanctions and
facilitate the discussion of the conceptual framework underpinning the predictor and
outcome variables examined in this study.
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Literature Search Strategy
I conducted extensive literature searches on several peer-reviewed articles and
journals, which I retrieved online from subject-specific databases. The sources were
Business Source Complete, Emerald Insight, ABI/INFORM Collection, LegallTrac,
NexisUNI, Criminal Justice Database, SocINDEX, Taylor and Francis Online,
LexisNexis, Ovid Journals, and multidisciplinary databases like EBSCO, Thoreau, and
Google Scholars. I searched ProQuest Central to retrieve dissertations and theses related
to public procurement debarment. I also retrieved relevant information from several
textbooks and government publications that focused on procurement frauds and
debarment practices in the public sector. Key search terms included the following:
debarment, debarment list, procurement integrity, contracting integrity, procurement
blacklist, public procurement fraud, public contracting fraud, suspension, debarred,
suspension and debarment, procurement fraud, contractors, contractors, suppliers, pubic
funds, City of Chicago, exclusion records, procurement integrity, blacklist, deterrence,
deterrence theory, predict, predictive, and prediction. The maximum search period was
limited to studies published within the last 5 years. Unfortunately, after running several
searches in different databases, including Walden University library staff-assisted
searches, the search result revealed very few peer-reviewed literatures on the topic of the
debarment list available in the databases. Therefore, researching beyond 5 years was
necessary to understand debarment practices and policies in public contracting.
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Theoretical Foundation
I applied the deterrence theory to frame this study. Deterrence theory holds that a
sanction will ensure compliance of laws and deter future criminal violations of laws
(Beccaria, 1986 [1764]; Kennedy, 2009; Piquero, Paternoster, Pogarsky, & Loughran,
2011). The rationale for the choice of deterrence theory was predicated on the assumption
that debarment sanction is a deterrence-oriented program that may prevent fraudulent
contractors from receiving government contracts (Roberts, 2010). I used deterrence
theory to explain the role of debarment sanction as a deterrence-focused program
established by the government in public contracting to protect itself from awarding
contracts to unscrupulous contractors. As applied to this study, debarment presumed
deterrence of future violations such that if the exclusion is certain, swift, and severe
enough (Tomlinson, 2016), then the consequences of debarment action will outweigh the
reward a contractor obtained from the crime commission (Auriol & Søreide, 2017).
Origin of Deterrence Theory
Contemporary deterrence theory originated from the earlier works of Beccaria’s
(1986 [1764]) Essay on Crimes and Punishments and Bentham’s (1988 [1789]) An
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Tomlinson, 2016). Beccaria
agued in his treatise that individuals will make decisions to pursue their desires and avoid
pains and may even commit crimes unless deterred. He believed swift and certain
punishment would likely prevent and control crimes. For laws to have deterrent value,
Beccaria advocated for clearly written laws whose punishments should be commensurate
with the crime committed and made known to the public so that people in the society
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would understand the consequences of their behavior. Bentham thought that any
individual could determine the utility of an action. He advocated that the law’s object is
to promote societal happiness and lessen pain by “punishing and rewarding” (Bentham,
1988, p.189). His idea led to a criminological assumption that people break the law
because lawbreaking benefits outweigh the consequences or costs associated with being
caught and convicted (Byrne, 2015; Pratt et al., 2006). The classical perspective of
Bentham’s proposition suggests that an individual can commit a crime in any given
situation. However, an individual can make a rational decision based on the analysis of
the cost and benefits of his or her action (Byrne, 2015). At the instance of rational
decision, the sanction for a crime is likely to deter a potential offender if that sanction
surpasses the benefits of the crime. Such sanction must be certain and swift through the
efficient legal or administrative system (Byrne, 2015). Bentham’s concept on rational
decision-making on the benefits of crimes coupled with Beccaria’s principles on crimes
and punishment, eventually formed what is now known as deterrence theory (Tomlinson,
2016). Deterrence theory views “humans as rational and hedonistic” (Purpura, 2019, p.
67). That is, deterrence theory suggests that if the punishment for crime is certain, swift,
and severe, then an individual is likely not to repeat the crime. At the same time, society
would have understood the consequences of committing a crime (Purpura, 2019).
Deterrence theory is the foundation underlying criminal punishment in today’s criminal
justice system (Tomlinson, 2016).
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The Scope of Deterrence Theory
The meaning of deterrence theory is wide in scope. A survey of literature on
deterrence showed that many scholars have provided divergent empirical and theoretical
interpretations to explain the deterrence theory. Paternoster (2010) described deterrence
as the prospect of reducing or preventing illegal or unethical acts through threats of legal
sanctions or penalties. Geis and Hailes (2016) described deterrence as having the
propensity to cause “fear” and “denial” in the commission of a crime (p. 57). Nagin
(2013) defined deterrence as “preventative effect of the threat of punishment” (p. 84),
that is, “behavioral response to the perception of sanction threat” (Nagin 2013, p. 253).
Elliot (2013) described deterrence as a process by which a threatened act is not
committed due to deterrent punishment. These definitions point to a convergent meaning:
an individual or a population experiences deterrence.
Deterrence theory is contextualized as specific deterrence and general deterrence.
On the one hand, the concept of specific deterrence postulates that an individual who
commits a crime and is caught and punished will be deterred from future criminal activity
due to the individual’s experience of punishment (Nagin, 2013; Tomlinson, 2016). On the
other hand, the concept of general deterrence proposes that the general population will be
deterred from offending due to their response to the threat of punishment. The population
will become aware of others being apprehended and punished (Elliot, 2003; Nagin, 2013;
Piquero et al., 2011). Some studies on classical deterrence theory, such as Bridges and
Stone (1986) and Schneider and Ervin (1990), erroneously suggested that specific and
general deterrence concepts have mutually exclusive occurrences. However, other studies
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asserted that both specific and general deterrence are not exclusive but merely apply the
same mechanism in different populations (Gibbs, 1968; Elliot, 2003; Maxwell & Gray,
2007; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001). Specific deterrence concerns an offender who has been
caught and who would be deterred from committing the same or similar crime due to
experience of the punishment for the crime (Elliot, 2003). General deterrence concerns
potential offenders who have not yet been caught but would be deterred by the threat of
punishment (Elliot, 2003).
Classical deterrence theory is open to reconceptualization (Tomlinson, 2016). For
example, Stafford and Warr (1993) introduced punishment avoidance to reconceptualize
deterrence theory to mean that an individual can experience both specific and general
deterrence occurrences concurrently. Punishment avoidance means that an individual
who commits a crime is not caught and escapes criminal justice punishment (Stafford &
Warr, 1993). In this regard, a specific deterrence effect will include direct experience
with punishment and punishment avoidance, while the general deterrence effect will
include indirect experience with punishment and punishment avoidance (Stafford &
Warr, 1993). The reconceptualized deterrence theory finds support in Paternoster and
Piquero’s (1995) research that confirmed concurrent effects of specific and general
deterrence in college students’ perception of punishments. Otherwise, deterrence theory
will fail when a crime is not discovered, reported, or prosecuted successfully (Purpura,
2019).
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Assumptions of Deterrence Theory
According to Tomlinson (2016), deterrence theory hinges on three assumptions:
“clear message, perception of sanction, and rational decision” (p. 33). A clear message is
the relay of a crime’s consequence to a target group (Tomlinson, 2016). Perception of
sanction refers to when a target group receives the message and perceives it as a threat
(Tomlinson, 2016). Deterrence theory also assumes a rational decision on the effects of
sanction for a crime over the benefits of the crime (Byrne, 2015).
Tenets of Deterrence Theory
Extant studies showed that deterrence theory operates on three crucial tenets:
certainty, celerity, and severity of punishment (Maxwell & Gray, 2007; Nagin &
Pogarsky, 2001; Paternoster, 2010).
Certainty. The tenet of certainty refers to the level for which a prospective
offender faces a high probability of being caught if the offender commits a crime
(Tomlinson, 2016). An offender who perceives a very low probability of being caught
will likely commit a crime. Different studies show different results for the certainty of
punishment. Maxwell and Gray (2007) and Marlowe et al. (2005) showed that the
certainty of punishment effect deterred probationers in a drug rehabilitation program.
Matthews and Agnew (2008) argued that the certainty of punishment affects deterrence
because an individual with high risk-sensitivity will not be likely to commit a crime.
However, Kleck, Sever, Li, and Gertz (2005) showed that the certainty of sanction threats
had little effect on recidivism. These mixed results in research literature show that
classical deterrence theory applies only to a particular category of crimes (Geerken &
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Gove, 1977; Silberman, 1976) and the conditions - individual differences and situational
differences, under which sanctions affect compliance (Piquero et al., 2011).
Celerity. The tenet of celerity relates to how quickly an offender receives
punishment after being caught for committing a crime (Pratt & Turanovic, 2018). A study
by Nagin and Pogarsky (2001) showed that variation in celerity did not predict offending.
Any delay between the time the offense was committed, and when the offender is
punished will decrease the sanction’s deterrent effect (Tomlinson, 2016).
Severity. The tenet of severity refers to the degree of punishment that is
corresponding to the type of crime committed by the offender (Nagin, 2013). The
deterrent effect of this tenet suggests that very severe punishment for breaking the law
can deter an individual from committing a crime. However, studies conducted on
incarceration in the United States did not confirm this assumption to be true because
incapacitation also has a cofounding effect on crime reduction rate (Kleck et al., 2005;
Paternoster, 2010). Kovandzic et al. (2004) showed that deterrence-oriented sanctions
such as three-strike legislation have an inverse effect on deterrence and may increase
crime.
There is a consensus among scholars that the certainty, celerity, and severity of
punishment are the crucial tenets of deterrence theory that will deter an offender and a
would-be offender from committing future crimes (Maxwell & Gray, 2007; Nagin &
Pogarsky, 2001; Paternoster, 2010). However, studies conducted on these tenets showed
mixed results on the effectiveness of deterrence theory (Braithwaite, 2018; Chalfin &
McCrary, 2017; Purpura, 2019; Tomlinson, 2016).
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The Empirical Deterrence Equation
The classical deterrence theory equation can be explained by a simple model that
encapsulates all the basic tenets and deterrence theory assumptions. Several studies
support the logic behind the model that certainty of the punishment increases deterrence
because the high probability of punishment determines the cost of crime commission
(Nagin, 2013). The severity of the probable punishment correlates with the probability of
a high cost of the crime (Crump, 2018). The celerity of punishment becomes valuable
only if it facilitates the objective of severity and certainty of punishment (Crump, 2018).
The following mathematical expression will represent deterrence:
Proposition 1: Crime will be successful if and only if
S x P x C > V………………………Assessment of success
Proposition 2: Crime will fail if and only if
S x P x C < V ……………………. Assessment of failure
S = Severity of punishment, P = Probability (certainty) of punishment, C =
Celerity of punishment and V = the value of committing crime
Proposition 3: Deterrence of a rational offender is possible if and only if
Assessment of Failure – Assessment of Success > 0

Figure 1. The deterrence equation.
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A rational offender will be deterred if and only if the assessment of failure on
crime commission is higher than the assessment of the success of crime commission such
that the value of the deterrence equation in Figure 1 is greater than zero. This is the
equation of classical deterrence theory in its empirical form based on the assumptions
discussed earlier in this study. Recall that deterrence theory assumes a contractor is
rational; this assumption suggests that a rational contractor will be deterred if the
evaluation of failure is higher than the evaluation of success. The most effective
deterrence can happen when an individual perceives sanction threats and the probability
of apprehension based on the individual’s decision-making (Tomlinson, 2016). In other
words, if the punishment for the crime is not severe enough to discourage an offender
from a crime commission, the offender will not be deterred from committing future
crimes (Tomlinson, 2016).
Application of Deterrence Theory
The application of deterrence theory is noticeable in several policy studies. For
example, The World Bank established its debarment sanction with a clear deterrence
purpose to achieve procurement integrity (Fromageau & Chazournes, 2012; The World
Bank, 2014). Fariello and Bo (2015) stated that about 93% of The World Bank’s
sanctions were through debarment remedy. My review of literature also found that the
application of deterrence theory has been tested to be useful in nuclear warfare through
mutually assured destruction (Mearsheimer, 1985; O’Neil, 2011), antitrust sanctions in
private corporations (Lande & Davis, 2011), speed limits in public road safety (Ritchey
& Nicholson-Crotty, 2011), and increased policing enforcement (Nagin, 2013; Watson,
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1986). These examples show that deterrence-based policies deter crime when there are
sanctions that strengthen the would-be violator’s perception of certainty of being caught.
Based on my extensive literature review, I found that a consensus on classical
deterrence theory suggests that both the specific and general deterrence are dependent on
how a criminal perceives the severity, certainty, and celerity of sanctions (Gibbs, 1968;
Maxwell & Gray, 2007; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001). Although, there is evidence of
neglected linkage in deterrence theory. Recent studies on deterrence theory have
introduced certain reconceptualization such as punishment avoidance (Stafford & Warr,
1993), deter-ability (Jacobs, 2010), defiance (Chambliss, 1967; Paternoster, 2010), and
social context of individual decision-making (Pogarsky et al., 2004). In sum, scientific
evidence showed that the deterrence effect on legal sanction is marginal (Tomlinson,
2016), but it is difficult to precisely determine the strength of the deterrence effect of the
criminal justice system (Paternoster, 2010). Goals set forth by deterrence theory prescribe
that the certainty of an individual being caught is a more effective deterrent than
punishment (Nagin, 2013).
Rationale - The Link Between Deterrence Theory and Debarment Sanction
As stated earlier in this chapter, recall that the celerity, certainty, and severity of
punishment are the crucial tenets of deterrence theory that may deter a rational offender
and a would-be rational offender from committing future crimes. Similarly, in the context
of government contracting, the elements of debarment deterrence are the probability of
catching a rational contractor for procurement violations (celerity), probability of
debarment (certainty), and the probability of listing in debarment list (severity).
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Studies showed that contractors might be deterred from committing procurement
frauds if there is a high possibility of being caught (Auriol & Søreide, 2017), provided
that the costs of fraudulent activity outweigh the benefit of the activity from the
perspectives of the would-be offenders (Auriol, Hjelmeng, & Søreide, 2017), and are
aware of the law of crimes and sentences by understanding the reaction of criminal
justice system to a commission of crimes (Crump, 2018). Debarment is not a punishment
(Tillipman, 2012); it is not to coerce or embarrass contractors, but it is a program that
leads to swift and certain sanctions to offer deterrence to contractors (Levy & Wagner,
2018).
To deter would-be fraudulent contractors, the government needs an intervention
strategy that establishes direct links between fraudulent behavior and consequences by
imposing sanctions that include exclusion of ineligible contractors from receiving
government contracts. Debarment sanction is a deterrence-oriented program established
by the government to deter contractors from committing fraudulent acts against the
government (Roberts, 2010). An effective government deterrence-oriented program
should have the capacity to prevent, detect, and prosecute contracting misconduct (Auriol
& Søreide, 2017). More scholars agreed that debarment action is a severe deterrencefocused government action capable of protecting the government’s interest from
awarding contracts to an unscrupulous contractor (Crump, 2018; Williams-Elegbe, 2019).
Deterrence theory could explain how debarment deterrence can perform two roles
for the government: Debarment as a deterrence program can deter contractors through
fear of doing business with the government and denial of government contracts.
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Debarment sanction may instill fear into contractors’ minds by using a debarment list to
communicate the threat of being caught to the contractors and forces contractor willing to
do business with the government to consider their credibility as business partners of the
government. On the other hand, the deterrent effect of debarment provides government
opportunities to deny contractors government contracts by preventing fraudulent
contractors, protecting government interest, stopping fraud, and hindering contractors’
capability to commit fraud.
Conceptual Framework
The DDM (see Figure 2), which I deduced from the literature review, represents a
synthesis of the deterrence theory and debarment sanction concept.

Figure 2. The debarment deterrence model.
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The model provided the overall framework for this research. I formulated the
model by adapting Fawcett’s (1999) technique of “conceptual-theoretical-empirical [C-TE] formalization” (p. 31). I used the model as a “generative source of thinking” (Ravitch
& Carl, 2016, p.34), to indicate the importance of what to be studied based on the
research question and the significance of what the research aims to find (Yin, 2016).
In the model, a debarment list is viewed as a deterrent instrument with predictive
capabilities through debarment deterrence. By applying deterrence theory, debarment
sanction will exclude ineligible contractors from receiving contracts from the government
(specific deterrence). Deterrence can prevent would-be ineligible contractors from doing
business with the government (general deterrence). Figure 2 illustrates the Debarment
Deterrence Model, which I used in this study to answer the research question. This model
consists of three domains - predictor variables, debarment deterrence, and predicted
outcomes.
Predictor Variables
The predictor variables are the length, fraud, and location appearing in the Model.
The direction of an arrow from each predictor variable indicates that the variable is in the
debarment list. The precise relationship between the dimensions of the predictor variables
is predictable (Fawcett, 1999).
Debarment Deterrence
Debarment deterrence is a phenomenon that assumes that a debarment list is a
general deterrent resource or asset, which government contractors can perceive as a
source of sanction threat, which can impact the present responsibility of the contractors.
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This is because a debarred contractor’s information would be published in a debarment
list for public viewing (DeVecchio & Engel, 1992). This assumption is consistent with
the findings of Peirone (2018), who argued that the debarment list could drive other
contractor’s behaviors and portends a “significant reputational risks on contractors” (p.
24). As a result, under the classical deterrence theory, the assumption is that a debarment
list should have a general deterrent effect on rational contractors willing to participate in
government procurements. In other words, the debarment list relays a clear message of
the consequence of fraudulent activities to contractors that are willing to make rational
decisions to abstain or otherwise, from the commission of procurement frauds. In
debarment deterrence concept, a debarment list may become more effective if it rests on
the plateau of deterrence theory (see Figure 2). Therefore, a debarment list meets the
assumptions for which classical deterrence theory will be useful.
Outcome Variables
The outcome variables in the model are Firm and Individual contractors,
representing the outcome of debarment sanction. To explain the deterrent effect of
debarment sanction and predictive application of debarment list based on classical
deterrence theory, the arrows flying from the debarment list in Figure 2 indicate the
magnitude of the unknown odds or probabilities of contractors, P(Firm) and
P(Individual). Therefore, the proper alignment between predictor variables, debarment
deterrence, and outcome variables is what led to the predictive capability of the
debarment list. This study applied statistical techniques that calculated the contractors’
odds and probabilities that may be debarred from the City, as presented in Chapter 4.
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Debarment Sanction System
The debarment sanction system has received the attention of scholars such as
Sope Williams-Elegbe and Tina Søreide. Both authors have conducted several scholarly
works in the field of debarment practice. Also, government agencies like GAO and GSA
have released several reports on the debarment system. Williams-Elegbe analyzed the
debarment in World Bank-financed contracts (Williams, 2007), and provided a
comparative evaluation of contractor debarments for corruption across some select
countries (Williams-Elegbe, 2012). Also, the scholar reviewed public procurement
reforms in Africa (2015), evaluated debarment in Africa (2016), and examined the
implications of negotiated settlements in public procurement debarment (WilliamsElegbe, 2019). Søreide provided compelling discourse on economic analysis of
debarment (Auriol & Søreide, 2017), and debarment deterrence in corruption and anticorruption sanctions regime (Søreide, 2015). GAO reported extensively on debarment
procedures (GAO, 1987), provided government agencies recommendations for data
reporting improvements (GAO, 2005), attention and oversight (GAO, 2011) and
suggested action needed to promote transparency (GAO, 2012).
As an antecedent to debarment, extant studies showed that fraud exists in public
procurement (Achua, 2011; Aremu, 2015; Beth, 2005; Clark, Coviello, Gauthier, &
Shneyerov, 2018; Jenny, 2005; Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016; Schuchter & Levi,
2016; Williams-Elegbe, 2016). Part of the reasons adduced to public procurement fraud is
that public procurement is highly vulnerable to corrupt practices (Cerrone et al., 2018;
Piper, 2017). This vulnerability is because procurement is primarily concerned with
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planning and spending of vast sums of public money to buy goods and services
(Independent Broad-based Anti-Corruption Commission, 2016; Piper, 2012). The
vulnerability of public procurement to fraud is traceable to the major stakeholders in
public procurement. On the one hand, studies showed that public procurement fraud
involves contractors that perpetuate collusion, price-fixing, or uncompetitive practices to
deny the government of value for money in the procurements of goods and services
(Hudon & Garzón, 2016; Tanaka & Hayashi, 2016; Williams-Elegbe, 2019). On the other
hand, other studies showed that public procurement fraud involves public officials who
desire to gain inducements over monetary transactions by exercising improper discretions
to favor preferred contractors (Graycar, 2019; Manning, 2005; Morgner & Chene, 2014).
These studies altogether confirmed that the exchange of money between public
procurement officials and private contractors is a valuable instrument that also makes
public procurement susceptible to corruption (Graycar, 2019; IBAC; 2016). In this
context, incentives appear to trigger collusion between government officials and private
contractors push for benefits advantage and share gains - a phenomenon Rose-Ackerman
and Palifka (2016) described as “grand procurement corruption” (p. 99).
Evidently, from the preceding, government contractors’ fraudulent activities have
necessitated the need to exclude contractors that are found to be nonresponsible from
doing business with the government. A contractor that has been investigated and
convicted of violating procurement laws or committing other offenses indicating an
absence of business integrity or honesty is deemed to be a not presently responsible
contractor (FAR, 2014). According to Section 9.407-2(c) of FAR, not presently
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responsible is a hallmark of debarment; it positions debarment as an inquiry focused only
on the current state of the contractor.
Figure 3 illustrates the flow of major activities in a debarment sanction system.
When a contractor is determined to be not presently responsible, an agency may impose
debarment sanction on the contractor if the agency determines that such action is needed
to protect the government’s interests, and eventually listing the debarred contractor in the
debarment list (GSA, 2019).

Figure 3. Debarment sanction system.
The literature survey I conducted showed that debarment sanction had become a
standard practice in many international public agencies and government agencies. For
example, multinational development banks (MDBs) such as African Development Bank,
Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, InterAmerican Development Bank, and The World Bank keep debarment lists of unscrupulous
individuals and companies as part of their debarment sanctions regime (Søreide et al.,
2016). Debarment actions taken by these banks are mutually enforceable (Levy &
Wagner, 2018). In other words, a debarred contractor in one MDB may face debarment
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for the same violation for the same misconduct by other MDBs parts (ABA, 2018). Any
contractor debarred by one MDB may be debarred by the other MDB participating in the
cross-debarment systems (Levy &Wagner, 2018). The World Bank approved the “Mutual
Enforcement of Debarment Decisions” agreement with major regional MDBs in 2010 to
prevent corruption and fraud in public procurement (Nesti, 2014).
The United Nations (UN), through its Contractor Review Committee applies
debarment procedures to protect its interests by ensuring it does business with responsible
and competent contractors (UN Procurement Manual, 2020). Each UN organization uses
debarment sanctions to protect the UN’s interests. Public procurement hinges on public
funds’ expenditure and thus requires good governance (Shakya, 2015). Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] (2016) asserted that a keystone of
good governance is the integrity that leads to public trust. The role of good governance in
government procurement is to promote the rule of law and upholding principles of
procurement such as value-for-money, transparency, anti-corruption, competition,
efficiency, and due process (Beth, 2005; Cutler, 2018; OECD, 2005; Passas, 2007; Veiga,
Schapper, Calvo-Gonzalez, & Berroa, 2011). For example, in Nigeria, the federal
government enacted the Public Procurement Act in 2007 to ensure efficient and effective
good governance in public procurement (Williams-Elegbe, 2015). The Nigerian
government is set to improve values for its citizenry by buying goods and services based
on best practice public procurement principles and procedures, which include a formal
debarment sanction regime. Debarment sanction is a public procurement regulation the
US government uses as the last resort to protect the government’s interests (ISDC, 2019).
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Figure 4 summarizes the number of debarment actions by the U.S. government from
2009 through 2017. The United States government has implemented 10,982 debarments
between Fiscal Year 2009 and 2017 (ISDC, 2019).

Figure 4. Bar chart for the U.S. debarments from 2009-2017. From “The Interagency
Suspension and Debarment Committee Annual Report to Congress,” by U.S. Interagency
Suspension and Debarment Committee, 2018 (https://www.acquisition.gov/sites/default
/files/page_file_uploads/Control%20ISDC%20FY%202017%20Report_Final_07_31_20
18%20-2.pdf). In the public domain.
Further literature review showed evidence of corruption in the form of fraud,
waste, and abuse in the public procurement (OECD, 2016; Schooner, 2004; Shakya,
2015). The prevalence of public procurement corruption compelled the government to
mandate debarment as either an administrative or statutory remedy to prevent public
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procurement corruption (Williams-Elegbe, 2019). Debarment remedies are consistent
with other goals of public procurement regulations, like transparent public procurement
procedures and sanctions, in the prevention of fraud, wastes, and abuse such that
government supplies and contracts are awarded to only eligible contractors.
There is a consensus among authors that a debarment sanction system is a useful
tool for protecting the government from awarding contracts to fraudulent, unethical, and
nonperforming contractors (Dubois, Swan, & Castellano, 2015; Shaw & Totman, 2015;
Søreide, 2017; Williams-Elegbe, 2019). As such, any contractor listed in the debarment
list is automatically disqualified from receiving contract awards from the government for
a specified period. However, in certain limited instances, exclusion may not be automatic
if there is a compelling need for an excluded contractor’s services or products, such as
military supplies (GAO, 2005, 2012).
Definition of Debarment List
Many organizations, authors, and scholars have attempted to define or describe a
debarment list in different terms. Debarment list, otherwise known as the Excluded
Parties List System (EPLS), is an electronic register of companies excluded from the
United States government’s procurement and nonprocurement activities (GSA, 2019). It
is a government-wide compilation of contractors that are ineligible to receive contracts in
federal procurement and nonprocurement programs (GSA, 2019). Manuel (2012) defined
the debarment list as a list of excluded contractors, which “contracting officers must
check before awarding a contract” (p. 2). Harker and Castellano (2017) described the
debarment list as a list of companies excluded from government procurement activities.
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The debarment list is a government repository containing information about contractors
determined to be ineligible to receive contracts from the government (Levy & Wagner,
2018).
Furthermore, GAO (1987) described a government agency’s debarment list as a
list of contractors that are excluded from doing business with a government agency.
Some international organizations, such as Transparency International (2013), described
the debarment list as a web-based “blacklisting register” (p. 1). The register is available
online for the wider public to consult. MDBs such as The World Bank Group (2020)
described the debarment list as a list of firms and individuals that cannot receive contract
awards from the World Bank-financed contracts for a stipulated period. The World
Bank’s fraud and corruption policy prescribe that firms that have violated the fraud and
corruption provisions of the Clause 1.14 of The World Bank Procurement Guidelines or
the Clause 1.12 of The World Bank Consultants Guidelines must be blacklisted (The
World Bank Group, 2020).
A debarment list typically contains information about contractors that are
excluded on procurement grounds and nonprocurement grounds. So also, it contains
information on contractors debarred under federal statues (statutory or mandatory
debarment) or contractors debarred under FAR (discretionary or administrative
debarment). According to GAO (1987), debarment list has two primary purposes: (a) to
provide a single and comprehensive listing of contractors debarred by government
agencies from receiving contracts, and (b) to inform agencies about government
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debarment actions so that the agencies will ensure that they award contracts to only
responsible contractors.
Having reviewed extant literature on the debarment list, for this study, I will
define a debarment list as a list that contains the names and other information about
nonresponsible contractors excluded from receiving future government contracts due to
prior violations of government laws or regulations and failure to perform under their
contractual obligations.
Functions of Debarment list
•

Transparency. A debarment list is a transparent product of a due process of
debarment proceeding outcomes and their reasons (Dubois, Swan, &
Castellano, 2015).

•

Public data. It provides data on procurement frauds, waste, and abuse risk
patterns against present and future award of contracts. This data can be
analyzed to make statistical predictions appropriate for resolving policy issues
on the debarment regime.

•

Accountability. It underscores the importance of monitoring timelines of the
debarment actions of an agency. Public and private organizations or
individuals can gain insights into an agency’s accountability efforts to
mitigate procurement frauds.

•

Tracking. Every potential contractor is vetted through a debarment list. A
contractor listed in it would not be eligible to participate in business activities
with government agencies and other public agencies.
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•

Deterrence. The debarment list makes information about punishment
cognitively inexpensive. It increases the probability of being caught and thus
serves as a deterrence to would-be procurement violators.

Effect of Debarment List
•

Public listing. An agency posts the name and address of a debarred contractor,
including information about the exclusion in a debarment list (FAR 9.404(b)),
which may be published online for public viewing (Levy & Wagner, 2018).

•

Procurement activity. A debarred contractor is immediately prohibited from
receiving contracts and subcontracts from the government agencies (FAR
9.405(a) (Levy & Wagner, 2018).

•

Nonprocurement activity. A debarred contractor may be excluded from
participating in government nonprocurement transactions such as loans,
grants, subsidies, and cooperative agreements (ABA, 2018).

•

Contractor. An individual debarred will likely face unemployment with a
federal government agency or will be unable to maintain or obtain a security
clearance. Ineligibility to receive contracts from the government due to
debarment action can have negative business consequences for the debarred
corporation. Debarment may negatively impact the reputation of a corporation
listed in the debarment list. Debarment action on an entity may be imputed to
other entities or affiliates engaged in a joint venture (FAR 9.406-5(c) (Levy &
Wagner, 2018).
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•

Reciprocity (Cross debarment). Many state agencies have provisions for
reciprocal debarment across other states and federal levels of government. In
cross debarment practice, a local government may not award contracts to a
contractor currently active in the state or federal debarment list (ABA, 2018).
For example, Section V(i) of the City of Chicago Debarment Rules stipulates
that the City may debar a contractor that is actively debarred by “any other
government agency.”

Evolution and History of Debarment List in Public Contracting
The authority for debarment in government procurement in the United States
evolved from the concept of responsibility (Gallagher, 1988; Gantt & Panzer, 1957; Levy
& Wagner, 2018; Miller, 1955; Swan & Castellano, 2015). According to Manuel (2012),
the federal government based its contracting practices on a concept of doing business
with qualified “responsible bidders” (p. 1). The broad scope of the concept of
responsibility in procurement implies that a contractor must be a responsible bidder to
receive federal contracts (Gantt & Panzer, 1957; Levy & Wagner, 2018). This
responsibility standard, which emerged as the process to enforce statutory social and
economic policy, continues today, especially in public contract laws and regulations
(ABA, 2018; Cibinic & Nash, 1986). Eventually, a debarment list evolved from the
government debarment process.
In the 1780s, debarment actions slowly became one of the major tools the U.S
military departments utilized to ensure that the military awarded future contracts to only
contractors that were sufficiently responsible for fulfilling statutory and contractual
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obligations (Nagle, 1999). Historical records showed that Robert Morris, the
Superintendent of Finance under the Continental Congress, introduced a methodological
competitive contracting process to supply foods to the Continental Army in Philadelphia
in 1781 (Nagle, 1999). This contracting process entailed advertising for contractors to
submit bids, opening sealed bids on the scheduled date, and negotiating and accepting the
best offers. The story is that Superintendent Morris used an appropriate methodology to
select contractors that are “men of substance and talents” (Nagle, 1999, p. 50) to perform
the excellent and reliable business of food supplies to the Continental Army. In today’s
government, this criterion connotes the selection of competent contractors who possess a
degree of “responsibility” (Nagle, 1999, p.50). During this period, no literature reported
that the government kept records of contractors that were found to be irresponsible.
In the 1880s, the U. S. government officially introduced legislation to back the
responsible bidding concept in government procurement (Levy & Wagner, 2018). The
United States Congress enacted the Act of July 5, 1884, which requires the executive
branch to award contracts to the lowest “responsible” bidder and reject any other bids
(Levy & Wagner, 2018). There was no practice of keeping an official list of contractors
excluded from doing business with the government until after World War 1 in 1918
(Gallagher, 1988). At this period, government contracting officers were probably advised
by word of mouth on their contractors’ performance or reputation (Gallagher, 1988).
In the 1920s, the concept of contractor’s responsibility gradually accelerated to an
idea of debarment in government contracting (Horowitz, 1983). The Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921 established the General Accounting Office (GAO), and in the
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years that followed, the Comptroller General had relied on the use of contractor’s
performance bond to compensate for the inadequate performance of a low bidder
(Horowitz, 1983). However, the first published opinion on debarment emerged in 1928.
The Comptroller General of GAO acknowledged that a performance bond was not
enough to protect government and thus proposed debarment action in a written memo (7
Comp. Gen, 1928) that:
When the interests of the United States require the debarment of a bidder, no
question will be raised by this office with respect thereto, provided the length of
the time of debarment is definitely stated and not unreasonable, and the reasons
for the debarment, with a statement of the specific instances of the bidder’s
dereliction, are made of record and a copy thereof furnished the bidder and this
office (pp. 547-548).
The highlight of the 1920s is that it was the period where the word “debarment”
was first mentioned in public contracting.
In the 1930s, debarment action was expressly introduced into government
contracting through several Congressional Acts to curtail contractors’ failure to meet
specific statutory and economic requirements (Levy & Wagner, 2018). For example, the
Buy American Act of 1933 was the first statute that contained an express debarment
provision that requires contractors to use American-produced materials, for which a
violation may result in a three-year debarment length from government contracts (41
U.S.C. §§ 10a-10d). Other statutes that contained express debarment provisions are the
amended David-Beacon Act of 1931, which requires construction contractors to pay their
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workers prevailing wages as determined by the Secretary of Labor [(40 U.S.C. § 276a2(a)] and Walsh-Healey Public Contract Act of 1936, which mandates inclusion of
specific stipulations in manufacturing and supply contracts that exceed $10,000 [(41
U.S.C. § 35)]. The Walsh-Healey Public Contract Act directs the Comptroller General to
compile names of persons or firms on a list and distribute it to all government agencies
[(41 U.S.C. § 6504(a)]. These Acts prescribe that any contractor that violates the terms in
the statutes may face a length of debarment spanning three years [(41 U.S.C. § 6504(b)].
This period became the first time an official debarment list was introduced into the
debarment process in government contracting.
In the 1940s, Congress continued its endorsement of federal contracting’s
responsibility standard (Gallagher, 1988). The government mandated military and
civilian agencies to specifically contract only with responsible bidders (Gallagher, 1988).
The Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 stipulates “responsible” bidder provision.
It established the Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR), which stipulates
debarment procedures for military agencies. The Act initially provides that a contractor
that violates the regulations is subject to a debarment length for a period up to 3 years or
5 years, depending on the nature of the violation but later limited to 3 years for all
violations (10 U.S.C. §§ 3202 et seq.) as administered by Department of Defense (DOD).
Likewise, The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 stipulates
debarment procedures for civilian agencies. The Act established the General Service
Administration (GSA), which maintained “responsible” bidder provision in its
regulations (40 U.S.C. §§ 471 et seq or 41 U.S.C. § 354). The Armed Services
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Procurement Act of 1947 and The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of
1949 became the forerunners to standardized debarment regulations (Gallagher, 1988;
Levy & Wagner, 2018). During this period, under ASPR, each military department
maintained its own debarment list (34 C. F. R. § 400.303). For example, the Adjutant
General of the U. S. Army maintained and published a confidential list of bidders to
whom awards will not be made (U.S.C. 81.13(g)(4) sup.1941), pursuant to Army’s
procurement authority. The United States Navy maintained a “List of Ineligible
Contractors” (34 C.F.R. 31.133) Supp.1947). The U.S Air Force maintained a “List of
Ineligible Contractors and Disqualified Bidders” (32. C. F. R. Ch. IV, Sec. 1000.303). In
this period, the debarment list of one military service also applied to other military
services [(32 C. F. R. §§1.604, 1.605-1 (1954)].
In the 1950s, improvements on debarment regulations became a more visible
priority of the government. A study conducted by Gantt and Panzer (1957) confirmed the
problem of several debarment lists across different agencies. It recommended that a
central list should be maintained by one agency on behalf of all federal government
agencies. The Reorganization Act of 1949 became operational and implemented as a
Reorganization Plan. GSA promulgated the Federal Procurement Regulations (FPR) in
1959 with express debarment authority and superseded the then-existing GSA
regulations. The GSA regulations prescribe that an executive agency’s debarment list
should be made applicable to the other agencies (41 C.F.R. Secs. 1-1.601 to 1-1.608
(1960), while it also served as a basis for debarment within DOD (32 C.F.R. sec.
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400.604-1(c) (Supp. 1954). This was the period causes for debarment were officially
enumerated in government debarment regulations.
In the 1960s, there was an exponential growth in government contracting with
concerns about fairness in the use of debarment actions (U.S. Department of Interior, n.d;
Gantt & Panzer, 1963; Levy & Wagner, 2018). In 1962, the Administrative Conference
of the United States (ACUS) extensively reviewed the debarment process, found
procedural deficiencies, and made nine recommendations to make debarment more
effective (Gantt & Panzer, 1963). Furthermore, the Contract Work Hours and Safety
Standards Act 1962 contained statutory debarment authority to protect workers’ right to
prevailing wages (40 U.S.C. 327). Some statues created by Congress that contained
debarment provisions include the Clean Air Act of 1963 to regulate air pollution (42
U.S.C. § 7606) and Service Contract Act of 1965, which governs wages working
conditions on service contracts over $2,500 (41 U.S.C. §§ 351-358, 1984). In this period,
a violation of these statutes by contractors may result in a three-year debarment from
receiving government contracts.
During the 1970s, many government agencies adopted their debarment
procedures, which resulted in variations in procedural safeguards in debarment actions.
Notably, in 1971, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) issued
regulations that contained debarment procedures that applied to not only contractors but
also to grantees (2 C.F.R. §12424). The Clean Water Act of 1972 also contained
debarment regulations that stipulate the debarment of persons or firms found in violation
of this Act (33 U.S.C. §1 1368). These variations necessitated the government efforts to
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address fairness and due process in debarment processes. In 1972, the Commission on
Government Procurement (COGP) recommended that the Office of Federal Procurement
Policy (OFPP) should conduct an expert policy review of debarment proceedings (Nagle,
1983). In 1974, GSA and DOD amended their existing debarment regulations to
guarantee effective due process for evidentiary hearing from contractors who oppose
their proposed debarment. This was the period COPG advised OFPP to propose policies
to establish uniformity of procedure to limit the length of debarment to 3 years for all
government agencies and publish a consolidated debarment list for all government
agencies (40 Fed. Reg. 22,318-19).
In the 1980s, the federal government faced increased political pressure to curb
fraud, waste, and abuse in government contracting (Levy & Wagner, 2018). U.S
Congress criticized some agencies, especially DOD, for lack of aggressiveness in using
debarment remedies to protect government interest from dishonest contractors. For
example, in 1981, the Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight of
Government Management recommended that the federal government issue regulation for
a government-wide suspension and debarment. In 1982, OFPP released a policy paper
that established substantive guidelines for uniform government-wide debarment [(47 Fed.
Reg. 28,854 (July 1, 1982)]. Upon implementation, any executive agency’s debarment
actions were honored by all other agencies (GAO, 1987). GAO developed a Consolidated
List of Suspended, Debarred, and Otherwise Ineligible Contractors (the Consolidated
List) to compile and disseminate the Consolidated List to government agencies. In 1982,
GSA began to publish the Consolidated List, which is distributed to federal agencies
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every month. Based on the OFPP report, Congress enacted the Defense Acquisition Act
(DAR) mandating military departments to honor debarments issued by federal agencies.
In 1983, GSA began to issue a weekly supplement to the Consolidated List to
improve reporting timelines (GAO, 1987). Eventually, in 1984, ASPR and FPR were
unified and designated as the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), thus strengthening
debarment authority (48 Federal Register 42,102, 42,142). In early 1984, GSA developed
a computerized method of keeping the information on the Consolidated List, which was
accessible only within GSA. In September 1986, GSA developed a short-term method
that granted some agencies with on-line computer access to its weekly updates with a
view to closing potential information loopholes (GAO, 1987). In 1986, the President’s
Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management recommended the use of specific
criteria (e.g., mitigating factors) needed for consideration to determine if a contractor is
“presently responsible.” Also, in 1986, President Bush signed an Executive Order 12549,
which created the Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee (ISDC), as an
advisory body to discuss current suspension and debarment related issues and assist in
developing unified Federal policy. The Packard Commission and ISDC recommendations
provided policy background that reinvigorated the government debarment list. For
example, in 1987, GSA implemented a government-wide access system for the
Consolidated List and rebranded later as Excluded Parties List (EPLS System). In this
period, improvements in the debarment list became consolidated in several agencies
while Congress and many agencies devoted more attention to debarment regulations.
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In the 1990s, there were issues about the deficiencies and loopholes in the
management of the Consolidated List because GSA had some difficulty providing timely
information about the list to government agencies. A report by GAO (1987) had found
that some debarred contracts continued to receive contracts from the government contrary
to the provisions of FAR. For example, some agencies’ contracting officers unknowingly
awarded contracts to contractors that had been debarred by other agencies because the
contracting officers did not receive timely monthly updates of the Consolidated List from
GSA. On March 17, 1997, GSA made the Consolidated List from Federal Procurement
and Non-procurement Programs available on the World Wide Web and accessible via the
Internet, yet still continued to publish the monthly paper version of the list (GSA, 1997).
In the 2000s, debarment regulations continued to expand in scope (Søreide,
2015); thus, each agency managed its own debarment list. The debarment mechanism
was strengthened and given more visibility because GSA launched the Excluded Parties
Lists System (EPLS) in 2007 (Martin, 2019). EPLS, among other things, listed the firms
or individuals debarred, suspended, proposed for debarment, or otherwise declared
ineligible from participating in Federal procurement programs (GSA, 2019). In 2009,
GAO evaluated EPLS and reported that some excluded parties on the EPLS were still
receiving federal contracts.
In the 2010s, debarment policy became more significant to Congress due to
increases in federal spending on contracts and reports that showed agencies awarded
contracts to excluded contractors (GAO, 2011; Lipowicz, 2009). The government stepped
up the incremental improvements it had made on the debarment process in the previous
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years to address various loopholes that had been discovered in the EPLS and to otherwise
increase its efficiency and effectiveness. Based on GAO’s (2009) report, GSA
determined that EPLS was inefficient to provide adequate search capabilities and
launched a new system known as the System for Award Management (SAM) on May 29,
2012 (Murray, 2019). SAM consolidated seven existing government systems into one
entity: the Federal Procurement System (FPS) and the Catalog of Federal Domestic
Assistance (CFDA), Central Contractor Registration (CCR), Federal Agency Regulation
(FedReg), Online Representatives and Certification Application (ORCA) and the
Excluded Parties List System (EPLS; GSA, 2012).
At the beginning of the 2020s, GSA implemented several significant updates to
SAM. GSA enhanced SAM with kick-out timer for better security and to deter fraud
(SAM, 2020). Currently, if an authenticated user is inactive for 30 minutes, SAM will
automatically log out the user.
From the above historical background, government debarment list evolved from
when contracting officer relied on the word of mouth to determine a presently responsible
contractor or otherwise, through when not presently responsible contractors were listed
on a piece of paper and to this current dispensation when not presently responsible
contractors are listed electronically on a web-based platform (SAM). According to
information published on GSA’s (2020) website, SAM is a “public-accessible web-based
directory of individuals and organizations that are not permitted to receive federal
contracts or assistance from the United States government.” The policy is that any
company currently doing business or willing to do business with the U.S. government
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must be sure not to enter SAM. Consistently, GSA introduces improvements to SAM to
meet the demand of immediate debarment actions. SAM is the official federal
government debarment list currently in use at the time of publishing this study.
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Table 1
Historical Landmarks in the Evolution of Debarment List
Year
1884
1928
1933
1935
1936
1947
1949
1959
1962
1963
1972
1978
1981
1982
1984
1986
1987
1997
2007
2011
2012
2020

Debarment event

Debarment list

Act of July 5, 1884 requires the executive branch to award
contracts to lowest responsible bidder and reject other bids
First published opinion on debarment by the Comptroller

Word of mouth

Congress enacted Buy American Act. The first statute to
contain express debarment provisions.
Congress enacted Davis-Bacon Act. It amended debarment

No official debarment list

Congress enacted the Walsh-Healey Public Contacts Act.
Debarment mandated as a penalty for violating the Act.
Congress enacted the Armed Services Procurement Act
whose regulations stipulate suspension and debarment
Congress enacted the Federal Property and Administrative
Services Act. It maintained the “responsible” bidder clause
GSA promulgated the Federal Procurement Regulations. It
supersedes its regulations with express debarment authority
The Administrative Conference of the United States
(ACUS) reviewed debarment processes.
Congress enacted the Clean Air Act. It mandates debarment
of persons found in violations of the Act
The Clean Water Act stipulates debarment of persons
Armed Services Procurement Regulations renamed as the
Defense Acquisition Regulation. Debarment retained
Senate sub-committee on Oversight of Government
Management recommended national debarment regulations
Office of Federal Procurement Policy released a policy for
substantive uniform government-wide debarment
Debarment authority strengthened by the creation of the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
Intragency Suspension and Debarment Committee
established to discuss agencies’ debarment issues
GSA implemented a government-wide Consolidated List

Yes. First time debarment list
was introduced (paper-based)
Debarment list can be
exchanged in the military
Each agency maintained its
own paper-based debarment list
Agencies must state causes for
debarment in debarment list
Paper-based list

GSA made Consolidated List available to the public on the
Internet. Available for free viewing and download.
Debarment gained more visibility because GSA launched
the Excluded Parties Lists System (EPLS)
Congressional Committee on Debarment and GAO
examined agency practices in debarment actions
Seven procurement systems consolidated into one large
system known as Systems for Award Management (SAM)
SAM enhanced with kick-out timer to deter fraud.
It will time out if inactive for 30 minutes

First time Consolidated List
became accessible online
Consolidated List replaced with
EPLS
EPLS continued as Web-based
list and accessible online
EPLS replaced with SAM
(Enhanced web-based list)
SAM currently has better
search capabilities online

No official debarment list

No official debarment list

Paper-based list
Paper-based list
Paper-based list
Paper-based list
Consolidated List distributed to
agencies
Consolidated List was
computerized for GSA only
GSA granted agencies limited
access to Consolidated List
Computerized list

57
Debarment Regulation
According to FAR (2014), Part 9, Subpart 9.4, suspension and debarment
programs are established to sanction firms or violators from obtaining contracts from the
government. FAR provides government-wide policies on debarment sanction and allow
agencies the flexibility to make specific debarment decisions. Studies showed that the
federal government’s debarment program is also replicated and codified into laws at other
levels of government (Williams-Elegbe, 2012). Levy and Wagner (2018) reported that
states and many local governments, such as cities or counties, further adopted debarment
laws and regulations that are based on ABA’s Model Procurement Codes. Although
states and cities used their discretions to design debarment laws and regulations that suit
their specific interests and needs, they conform to ABA’s Model or FAR (Levy &
Wagner, 2018). A contractor certifies that it has not been excluded, debarred, or
suspended from and is not, in any other way, ineligible to participate in any state or
federal governmental program.
The City of Chicago Debarment System
The City of Chicago has formal procedures for debarring contractors that are
based on criminal indictments or court convictions (City of Chicago, 2020). The City
adopted federal debarment laws and regulations and ABA’s Model Procurement Code for
State and Local Government. The City of Chicago maintains a list of Debarred Firms and
Individuals (see Appendix), that is recorded. The list contains the various types of
egregious offenses or violations attributed to the name of firms or individuals who are
either suspended or debarred from doing business with the City under Section 1-23-020
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of the Municipal Code. Under the Code, City’s Contracting Officers are required to check
the City’s debarment list to ensure that debarred contractors are not awarded City
contracts. In most situations, City officials are also required to check SAM before the
award of contracts. Contractors willing to do business with the City are expected to attest
to the State of Illinois-mandated debarment certification under 30 ILCS 500/50-10(e).
Also, a contractor must certify that neither contractor nor any of contractor’s directors,
employees, representatives, and subcontractors who may deliver supplies or provide
services under City contract are presently debarred by the U.S. government or by any
federal government agency (13 C.F.R. § 145). Under debarment rules, indicted firms or
individuals are debarred from engaging in business activities with the government. At the
federal government level, statutory debarment published in Federal Register is typically
determined by a criminal proceeding conducted by a court of the United States (ABA,
2018).
The concept of the City’s debarment practices originated from the federal
government. The City of Chicago Debarment first adopted its Debarment rules on
December 14, 2005. The current Debarment Rules, which were last updated on March
28, 2012 (as at the time of publishing this study) prescribe policies and procedures
governing the debarment of contractors by the Chief Procurement Officer (CPO) under
the authority of Chapter 2-92 of the Municipal Code of the City of Chicago and Chapter
65 of the Illinois Compiled Statutes in general and under the authority of 65 ILCS 5/8-1011 and 8-10-16 (City of Chicago, 2020). Debarment is a determination by the CPO that a
contractor or a person or entity is not responsible and is not eligible to enter into contracts
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with the City (City of Chicago, 2020). As it is in the federal government, the City’s
debarment’s goal is not to punish contractors, but to protect the City from unscrupulous
prospective contractors. Debarment allows the City to ensure that it does business only
with “responsible” contractors and subcontractors. Also, the City of Chicago procedures
for debarment takes into cognizance essential due process safeguards of notice that allow
contractors facing debarment action opportunity to present the matter in opposition (Levy
& Wagner, 2018). A contractor may avoid City’s debarment action if the contractor can
demonstrate to the City that the purported wrongdoing was an isolated instance and will
likely not happen again. The City does not maintain a web-based database of excluded
contractors but maintains a debarment list that is published online for easy public access.
The City of Chicago’s Debarment List Features
Section 1(b) of the City of Chicago Debarment Rules provides for the listing of
debarred contractors known as “List of Debarred Firms and Individuals” (City of
Chicago, 2020). The current list is a 12-page record of debarred contractors in PDF last
updated by the City on May 1, 2019 and retrieved for analysis for this study on August
13, 2020. For this study, the City’s List of Debarred Firms and Individuals will be
referred to as the “Debarment List.” The City’s Debarment List consists of the following:
Entity/individual. The name of the business organization being excluded from
receiving contracts from the City. The name includes the type of business operated by the
contractor and the contractor’s primary address.
Debarment date. The official date the CPO determined a contractor to be
nonresponsible and not eligible to receive future contracts from the City, either as a prime
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contractor or subcontractor. The contractor’s debarment became active on this date.
Length of debarment. The length identifies the specified period a contractor is
debarred from doing business in the best interests of the City. The length of debarment
under discretionary debarment depends on the facts and the circumstances of a given
allegation (Levy & Wagner, 2018, p. 182), while the length of debarment under statutory
debarment is dictated by law (FAR 9.406-4 (2). FAR 9.406-4(c) and allows agency
officers to reduce the debarment period. For example, upon written request to the agency,
a debarred contractor may have its “debarment length reversed or reduced provided there
is a new material evidence or judgment reversal” (ABA, 2018, p.184-185).
Reasons for debarment. The reasons for debarment are the City’s specific
grounds for debarring a contractor due to serious violation that it affects the contractor’s
present responsibility (City of Chicago, 2020). There must be a reason for debarment
(Williams-Elegbe, 2016). The reasons for debarment such as conviction of or civil
judgment for the commission of fraud or criminal offense relating to City contracts and
other misconduct showing lack of honesty as enumerated in Section V of the City’s
Debarment Rules. Also, under Section VI, Paragraph 6.01, the City enumerates a set of
potential mitigating factors upon which the contractor has the burden of demonstration to
satisfy the CPO that the debarment may not be required.
The City of Chicago’s Debarment Procedures Leading to Debarment List
The provision for debarment procedures as stipulated in Section VII of the City’s
Debarment Rules. The City commences a debarment process when a contractor is
convicted or alleged to have engaged in any of the violations enumerated in Section V of
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the City’s Debarment Rules. (Section V[a-i]). The information is referred to as the CPO,
who shall review the seriousness of the violation and decide to propose debarment and
designate a Debarment Officer to coordinate the debarment process until completed
(Section VI. Par. 6.01). The CPO shall issue Notice of Proposed Debarment (the
“Notice”) to the contractor (Section VI. Par. 7.02). The Notice is to inform the contractor
that debarment is being proposed, reasons for the proposed debarment stating that the
contractor may submit written opposition to the proposed debarment within 30 days after
receipt of the Notice, administrative contact and copy of City’s debarment’s rules
(Section VII. Par 7.02[a]-[f]). At this stage, the contractor is still eligible to receive
contracts from the City, but such a contract may be terminated if the contractor is later
debarred (Section VII. Par. 7.04[a][2]).
The existence of any of the enumerated causes for debarment does not necessarily
mean that the suspected contractor should receive an automatic debarment sanction. The
CPO has the discretion to determine if the cause(s) for debarment are less serious or
sufficiently serious (Section VII. Par. 7.04[b]). On the one hand, if the CPO determines
that the cause for debarment is less serious, the CPO may ask the contractor to provide
Show Cause letter that may lead to an administrative settlement between the City and the
contractor (See the definition of administrative settlement). On the other hand, if the
causes for debarment are sufficiently serious, and the evidence supporting debarment is
compelling, the CPO may decide to issue the contractor a restraining letter. The
contractor has ten days after the Notice or ten days after the date of the letter of restraint,
whichever is later, to contest the letter of restraint (Section VII. Par. 7.04[c]). At this
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stage, the contractor is not eligible to receive new contracts from the City unless cleared
in the debarment process.
Within 30 days of receipt of the Notice, the contractor is expected to submit all
supporting documents to a designated City Officer, containing all the facts and arguments
upon which the contractor contests the proposed debarment. The contractor or City may
require an in-person hearing to decide if debarment is necessary. Hearings shall be
conducted with fairness and transparency (Section VII. Par. 7.04[h][3]). After review of
all relevant facts and written records presented by the contractor, the CPO shall reach a
determination to either grant the contractor’s opposition to the proposed debarment or
summarily decline the contractor’s opposition to the proposed debarment. The CPO may
grant administrative settlement to a contractor whose misconduct the CPO found to be
improper but may not warrant full debarment (Section VII. Par. 8.04). However, the CPO
shall issue a formal letter of debarment to a contractor whose opposition to proposed
debarment is declined at the in-person hearing (Section IX, Par. 9.02). The CPO will
conclude the debarment proceedings by listing the name of the debarred contractor in the
City’s debarment list published in the City’s website (Section IX, Par. 9.04). Figure 5
depicts the City’s debarment procedures. This figure does not include every possible
scenario in the City’s debarment procedures but summarizes the main route through
which a contractor is listed in the City’s Debarment List.
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Figure 5. Flow chart for the City of Chicago’s debarment procedure. Constructed from information gathered

from “Debarment Rules,” by City of Chicago, 2020
(https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/dps/RulesRegulations/DebarmentRules4-24-15.pdf). In the
public domain.
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Predictor and Outcome Variables
Predictor Variables
The predictor variables in this study are the location of contractor, debarment
fraud, and length of debarment.
Location. This variable refers to the official place of business registration of
contractors currently doing business with the City. All contractors are expected to furnish
to the City their street address. Contracting with a contractor with only a post office
address in the profile is a potential indicator of the procurement fraud flag (Caulfield,
2014; Wight, 2012).
Debarment fraud. Debarment fraud is an egregious fraud that an agency
determines to cause exclusion of a contractor from doing business with the government in
a specified period (FAR, 2014). For this research, the two significant categories of
debarment fraud I identified in the literature are procurement fraud and nonprocurement
fraud.
Procurement fraud. Procurement fraud is misconduct that threatens the integrity
of procurement (OECD, 2016). Several authors have identified different procurement
fraud types that are perpetuated by contractors in public procurement (Caulfield, 2014;
Miranzo, 2017; Randon & Randon, 2015). The World Bank categorized procurement
misconduct subject to debarment into five categories viz corrupt, fraudulent, collusive,
coercive, and obstructive practices (The World Bank, 2016). These types of procurement
frauds are also evident in the City of Chicago Debarment List. I reviewed the City’s
Debarment List by taking a cue from The World Bank’s approach to procurement
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misconduct classification. I found that procurement frauds committed by debarred
contractors are in five major categories as follows:
Set-aside program frauds. The set-aside program is a procurement solicitation
program that is exclusively reserved for small businesses and minority women
(Stanberry, 2004). The City’s set-aside programs are Minority-owned Business
Enterprise (“MBE”), Woman-owned Business Enterprise (“WBE”), Disadvantaged
Business Enterprise (“DBE”), Business Enterprise owned by People with Disabilities
(“BEPD”). These set-aside programs were established by the City to ensure that a fair
proportion of the City’s contracts are awarded to small businesses and minority women.
Section V(d) of the City Debarment Rules prescribes that “making or attempting, or
causing to be made or attempting to cause to be made, any false, deceptive, or fraudulent
material statement in any application to obtain, expand, or continue certification as an
MBE/WBE/BEPD/DBE” is a ground for debarment. The City has debarred some
contractors who deceptively or fraudulently classified themselves as “women-owned” to
qualify for City’s set-aside contracts. For example, the City’s OIG Report (2020) found
that a contractor knowingly used its company as a minority “pass-through” to gain City
contracts. A review of the City’s Debarment List showed the City of Chicago debarred 35
contractors for set-aside program frauds in the fiscal years under review in this study.
Contract frauds. This type of fraud is a willful misrepresentation of contract
proposals or performance committed by a contractor to deceive the City. Contract frauds
span many fraudulent schemes such as bid-rigging, kickback, or contractor inducement of
procurement personnel with bribes to seek illegal favors in contract awards or approval,
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conflict of interest, defective quality and purchase order abuse (Rose-Ackerman &
Palifka, 2016; Yang, 2016). The City of Chicago debarred 40 contractors for contract
frauds in the fiscal years sampled in this study.
Phony companies to solicit contracts. This type of fraud is a deliberate effort to
establish fake companies to induce fraudulent payments from the City. Fictitious
companies that do not provide goods and services may be entered into the database to
siphon money from the City Treasury. The City of Chicago debarred 15 contractors for
operating on phony companies in the fiscal years sampled in this study.
Forgery or falsification of documents to seek contracts. This fraud is a willful
submission of forged tax documents or false statements regarding a material element of
certification to seek City contracts. The City of Chicago debarred 11 contractors for
forgery in the fiscal years sampled in this study.
Fraudulent invoices/voucher reimbursement claims. This type of fraud refers to
knowing the submission of fake invoices or vouchers for goods or services not delivered.
It also includes fraudulently inflating contract fee for fictitious claims. The City of
Chicago debarred four contractors for contract invoicing in the fiscal years sampled in this
study.
Nonprocurement fraud. Under government Nonprocurement Rule (NCR), a
nonprocurement is any transaction, which is not a procurement contract. Examples of
nonprocurement transactions include but are not limited to grants, cooperative
agreements, loans, scholarships, fellowships, contract assistance, loan guarantees,
subsidies, insurances, payments for specified uses, and donation agreements [(2 CFR §
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180.970 (a)]. The government expands its budget through nonprocurement programs and
activities, which are to “provide socio-economic and other assistance to the American
public” (Levy & Wagner, 2018, p. 32). The City of Chicago operates nonprocurement
programs as a cornerstone of the City’s economic and social policy that supports its
citizens and residents. Therefore, a City contractor determined to have violated the terms
of these nonprocurement programs may be convicted for criminal or administrative fraud
and face the City’s debarment action. The City of Chicago debarred 33 contractors for
nonprocurement frauds in the fiscal years sampled in this study.
Figure 6. Bar chart for types of fraud

Category of Fraud
Nonprocurement

33

Types of Fraud

Contract

40

Set aside

35

Phony

15

Forgery

11

Invoicing

4
0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Frequency

Figure 6 is a bar chart illustrating the types of fraud I identified in the City’s
debarment list. For clarity, I used the red bar to distinguish nonprocurement fraud from
procurement frauds.
Length of debarment. Length of debarment is the exclusion period a contractor
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is debarred from receiving contracts from the government (Levy & Wagner, 2018).
Manuel (2012) explained that the degree of a debarment’s cause would determine the
length of debarment, which may exceed three years. However, heads of agencies have the
prerogative to waive administrative exclusions if there are compelling reasons (Manuel,
2012). The length of debarment will typically match the gravity of the cause (GAO,
2012). Cerrone et al. (2018) found that the deterrent effect of debarment on contractor’s
collusion increases with the length of debarment. The history or pattern of conduct of a
contractor may be used to determine an appropriate length of debarment (City of
Chicago, 2020). For example, the City typically classifies length of debarment as either
permanent or lifetime. A contractor would receive permanent debarment if the City
determines that the contractor willfully registered the company to commit specific or any
procurement fraud, while lifetime debarment is for other violations.
Outcome Variable
An outcome variable is a dependent variable a researcher makes an attempt to
explain or predict (Polit & Beck, 2018). The outcome variable in the study is the business
entity. Debarment data from The World Bank (2019) report showed that 48 corporations
and individuals were debarred in the fiscal year 2019. This variable is the form of a
contractor’s business type, either a firm (corporation) or an individual (sole proprietor).
Business entity. A prospective contractor is expected to register with an
appropriate government agency, the type of business organization that meets its business
needs and legal obligations. Contractors willing to do business as a legal business entity
with the City must formally receive registration approval from the Illinois Secretary of
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State government, Illinois Department of Revenue (IDOR). These contractors must
register with the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to receive a Federal Tax
Identification Number. That is, an Employer Identification Number (EIN) either as a firm
or a sole proprietary. The business entities in this study are firm and individual.
Firm. For this study, a firm is a business entity where two or more persons run a
business together with mandated management and reporting obligations and in which the
entity’s finances are separated from personal finances (Garner, 2004). A firm can be a
Limited Partnership (LP), Limited Liability Partnership (LLP), Limited Liability
Corporation (LLC), Corporation, or Not-for-Profit Corporation (NFP).
Individual. Contractors who registered as a sole proprietorship can do business as
an individual. A sole proprietorship is a business entity in which an individual owns all
assets and liabilities and operates in a personal capacity (Garner, 2004).
Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, I presented the historical and integrative review of the literature on
the evolution of the debarment list and the current use of the debarment list in public
contracting. Specifically, I discussed the City of Chicago Debarment procedures and how
the City’s contractors can be listed in the debarment list. There is a critical gap in the
literature that requires ample study on debarment practices: understanding the linkage
between the predictive relevance of a debarment list and the effectiveness of debarment
deterrence on government contractors (ISDC, 2017). I chose the deterrence theory as a
predictive theory to provide an organizing structure for the study’s framework. By
considering literature consensus on classical deterrence theory, this study views
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contractors as rational and that when debarred following a violation or crime that is
certain, swift and severe, a contractor is less likely to repeat the crime and also the
message is sent to other contractors showing the consequences of a commission of a
crime (Purpura, 2019). A review of relevant literature confirmed that debarment sanction
could provide enough deterrence to keep fraudulent contractors from doing business with
the government (Cerrone et al.; 2018; Peirone, 2018). Although an extensive search of
the literature did not reveal any model that investigated the predictive applications of the
debarment list, however, I developed an original conceptual framework: The Debarment
Deterrence Model. The C-T-E technique (Fawcett, 1999) was adapted to facilitate
understanding of the same variables in the debarment list, the deterrence theory, and how
the theory would be operationalized in this research.
In Chapter 3, I use the model to examine how the relationship among location of
contractor, debarment fraud and the length of debarment can explain and predict the
deterrent effects of debarment sanction on contractors (firms and individuals) doing
business with the City. This model is essential because this study utilized the City’s
debarment list data to predict contractors’ fraud probabilities by focusing on variables
that show a tendency towards procurement fraud—a way of demonstrating that the ability
to deter public procurement fraud may be subject to the predictive capability of relevant
fraud data in a debarment list. The study’s research design, methodology, data analysis
plan, and threats to validity are discussed in Chapter 3 in greater detail.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
The research method in this chapter includes a description of the research design,
rationale, philosophical assumption, population, sample, sampling procedures, source of
data, data collection, and data analysis plan. The quantitative nonexperimental design I
selected was appropriate because it enabled me to assess whether the independent
variables of contractors listed in the debarment list can determine the statistical
probability of contractors (firms or individuals) that may be debarred from the array of
contractors doing business with the City. I also describe threats to validity, ethical
procedures, and the summary of this chapter.
Research Design and Rationale
Research Design
Research design is the specific plan researchers adopt to answer a research
question and strategies to strengthen the integrity of a study (Polit & Beck, 2017).
Research design describes how the research is structured to show how the alignment of
major components of the research addresses the central research question. Trochim
(2020) described research design as a “glue” that holds all the research elements together.
According to Cooper and Schindler (2003), research design establishes the plan for data
collection, measurement, and analysis.
I chose a quantitative nonexperimental design to analyze secondary data to
answer the research question of this study. Quantitative research involves the use of
numerical or statistical data to explain, predict, investigate relationships, describe current
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conditions, or examine possible impacts or influences on designated outcomes (Walden,
n.d.). In this study, I looked for statistical probabilities. Hence, the use of a quantitative
approach was consistent with the purpose of the study to investigate variables leading to
“precise measurement and quantification” (Polit & Beck, 2017, p. 415).
The three types of quantitative research design available to carry out this research
were experimental, quasi-experimental, and nonexperimental (O’Sullivan, Rassel, Berner
& Taliaferro, 2017). Experimental design allows a researcher to exercise control over all
variables that may affect an experiment’s result. The classic experimental design applies
a randomized posttest design to test an experimental group and a control group
(O’Sullivan et al., 2017). I used nonprobability sampling in this study, which did not
require an experimental group nor a control group. Therefore, experimental design was
not relevant to this study. A quasi-experimental design is like a classical experiment
except that the quasi-experiment subjects are chosen randomly by identifying a group of
subjects comparable to the group involved in the test (O’Sullivan et al., 2017). In this
study, I neither selected subjects randomly nor chose a comparison of two groups, so a
quasi-experimental design that utilizes comparison group pretest and posttest design was
not appropriate. I adopted a nonexperimental design for this study because, as Polit and
Beck (2017) suggested, this design is most appropriate for research in which the
“independent variables inherently cannot be manipulated” (p. 146). I did not manipulate
the independent variables in this study. I designed the study to take a snapshot of the
predictive application of a debarment list using a statistical analysis of data to answer a
descriptive research question. This selection is consistent with Johnson’s (2014)
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argument that a nonexperimental design does not require much control or intervention,
and it is “perfectly fine to answer descriptive and normative questions” (p. 67).
Moreover, the purpose statement and research question propounded in this study suggest
the need for secondary data, so this study’s design included secondary data analysis. The
goal of using secondary data analysis was to gain easy access to a reliable government
debarment data that would otherwise take several months and several dollars to collect.
Operationalization of constructs. I used the following specific variables from
the City’s debarment list:
Dependent variable. Business entity is the dependent variable in this study. It is
the type of business organization operated by a contractor. It is a nominal dichotomous
variable categorized as “firm” and “individual” for this study.
Independent Variable 1. Location of contractor is one of the independent
variables in this study. It is the City of business registration of a contractor. It is a
nominal dichotomous variable categorized as “City of Chicago” and “other cities” for this
study.
Independent Variable 2. Debarment for fraud is also an independent variable in
this study. It is a fraud committed by a contractor based on administrative decisions,
convictions, or civil judgments. It is a nominal dichotomous variable categorized as
“procurement fraud” and “nonprocurement fraud” for this study.
Independent Variable 3. Length of Debarment is the third independent variable in
this study. It is the exclusion period of a contractor from government business and a
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continuous ratio variable measured in years. For this study, the length of debarment is the
period between the date of debarment through the end of FY19.
Philosophical Assumption
Leavy (2017) suggested six philosophical worldviews that can be used to conduct
public administration research as follows: post-positivism, constructivism,
transformative, pragmatism, critical realism, and art-based intersubjective. Because this
study’s research design was a quantitative approach, I took the stance of post-positivism
as my philosophical belief to explain my chosen research approach. Post-positivism is a
philosophical interpretative framework that underscores determining empirical
observation and measurement and theory verification (Babbie, 2013; Creswell, 2016). As
a post-positivist, I approached this research to identify the causes that influence outcomes
by developing numeric measures of objective reality. Post-positivism recognizes the
existence of an orderly reality that can be studied objectively (Polit & Beck, 2017). For
this study, the objective reality is the City of Chicago’s Debarment List that currently
exists. To overcome the philosophical paradigm’s constraints, using post-positivism as an
interpretative framework for this study allowed me to avoid bias. At the same time, I
applied flexible choice of methods to match the purpose of the study, the research design,
and the needs of the setting population to conduct the research.
Rationale
The secondary data I analyzed were from the Debarment List of the City of
Chicago, which is currently archived on the City’s website and publicly accessible online.
The advantages of using secondary data are to permit a researcher to answer the research
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questions in less time and with lower costs than when using other data collection methods
like in-depth interviews, surveys, and observation (Nishishiba, 2014; Saunders, Lewis, &
Thornhil, 2016). A significant disadvantage was that I did not have control over how to
verify the quality and accuracy of the secondary data (see Nishishiba, 2014). This
disadvantage implies that I analyzed a pre-existing data, which I did not collect.
However, this disadvantage did not pose a serious concern for this study because it is
unlikely for the City to publish names of debarred contractors in the City’s official
Debarment List if these contractors were not actually sanctioned with debarment by the
City. The City may not have established its Debarment List for research purposes;
however, my research was an attempt to demonstrate that the ability to deter public
procurement fraud may be subject to a debarment list’s predictive capability. I resolved
that secondary data analysis would strengthen this study, whence the relationships among
variables in previously unanalyzed sample may lead to findings that can advance research
on the debarment list. Trzesniewski, Donnellan and Lucas (2011) argued that “archived
data tend to have higher quality than could be obtained by individual researchers” (p. 4).
The choice of an archived data for this study’s analysis finds support in the argument of
these authors. All the relevant data suitable for analysis to answer this study’s research
question are available in the City’s debarment list. Hence, the list is appropriate, valid,
and reliable.
In this study, I evaluated the individual and collective extent that the three
predictor variables predict the outcome variable. In other words, I used the predictor
variables to develop a statistical model to predict the outcome variables and assessed
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which of the predictor variables contributes to statistical significance to the model.
Adding another predictor variable to the model may improve model misfit (Osborne,
2015). There was no model misfit during statistical analysis. Therefore, I did not use a
confounder variable to influence substantial changes in the coefficients of other variable
in this study.
Methodology
Population
The target population is the entire statistical population under consideration in
research (Nishishiba, 2014; Polit & Beck, 2017; Simon & Goes, 2013). The target
population in this study was the debarred contractors in the City’s debarment list from FY
2008 through FY 2019. It is not necessary to investigate all levels of the American
government. Thus, I selected the City of Chicago’s municipal government as the
sampling frame within the public sector.
Sampling and Sampling Procedures
Sampling is a process of selecting a subset of the population to represent the
target population (Polit & Beck, 2017; Simon & Goes, 2013). The subset selected to
participate in this study is known as a “sample” (Nishishiba, 2014, p. 74). This study’s
nonprobability sampling plan was designed to yield a representative sample in which
cases selected from the target population shared common characteristics (Patton, 2015).
This plan was consistent with Johnson’s (2014) argument that sampling that is based on a
researcher’s judgment using very precise criteria “makes sense” (p. 156). For the research
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objective, research question, and design I chose for this study, the sampling plan included
the following steps:
1. identify the target population,
2. state the eligibility criteria, and
3. select the sample. (Nishishiba, 2014)
I used this sampling plan to seek out the best sample size for the study that could
produce the best data such that the research results were the direct results of the sampled
size (McNabb, 2018; Patton, 2015).
The sampling procedure involved cleansing the unit analysis of data in the
sample. I removed contractors listed with incomplete information in their unit of analysis.
For example, I removed contractors with no information about their location in the
Debarment List or whose specific reason for debarment was not stated. MacInnes (2017),
suggested that the subset in a unit analysis of the data should have similar characteristics
to all other cases in the dataset. The cases I selected represented a specific informationrich sample that could illuminate relevant group patterns. The idea was to make sure that
I analyzed the City’s Debarment List with all the relevant data for each contractor in the
sample. The sampling errors can be reduced if all the units selected already have known
characteristics representing the study population (O’Sullivan et al., 2017). These authors
also suggested that the calculation for sampling statistics does not apply to nonprobability
samples. This study’s design was a nonexperimental design; therefore, the use of power
analysis to calculate sample size was unnecessary.
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Table 2
Categories of Variables and Coding
Debarment
data

Code
identity

Variable
type

Measurement Coding
scale
numerical

Busines entity

Entity

Dependent

Nominal

Location of
contractor

Location Independent

Nominal

Debarment fraud

Fraud

Independent

Nominal

Nonprocurement = 0
Procurement = 1

Length of debarment

Length

Independent

Continuous

Not applicable

Individual = 0
Firm = 1
Other cities = 0
Chicago = 1

Table 2 shows that the study’s data consist of one dependent variable that is
dichotomous and measured on a nominal scale, two independent variables that are
dichotomous and measured on a nominal scale, and one independent variable that is
measured on a continuous scale. I coded these variables as 0 or 1, with 1 representing the
occurrence of the event of interest and 0 representing the absence of the event of interest.
Procedures for Data Collection
The data collection for this research only included secondary data. The study’s
primary source of data was the “PDF List of Debarred Firms and Individuals” of the City
of Chicago (2020). I retrieved the City of Chicago’s Debarment List from the Internet.
This list is a publicly accessible document available on the City’s website
(https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/dps/DebarredFirms/DebarredList05262
020.pdf). I saved all document data retrieved online for the analysis in a folder in my
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password-protected computer and secure online system, which only me had the access to.
The storage was to increase the reliability of the data analysis and applicability of my
findings, so that the evidence can be reviewed directly by future investigators, who may
provide a substantial base for the assertions I made in this study. I did not need to seek
permission from the City to access or obtain the Debarment List because the data I used
for the study was already published for the public on City’s official website. I analyzed
only data that is publicly accessible online. The Debarment List is a list of contractors the
City has determined to be ineligible to receive contracts from or do business with the
City, having followed the provisions for debarment procedures as stipulated in Section
VII of the City’s Debarment Rules (see Figure 5). I resolved that the data were
sufficiently reliable for the purpose of this study because it is a data inspired by real-life
administrative decisions.
The data collection period began in the middle of July 2020, shortly after I
obtained Walden University Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval. I persistently
spent one week searching the Internet for publicly published debarment lists that matched
this research sampling threshold. I did Internet searches looking for debarment lists in all
the fifty states in America. I searched up to 120 municipal or county governments, and 20
federal agencies. I also searched for the debarment list of multinational organizations
such as the World Bank and the UN. I selected the debarment list that I retrieved from the
City of Chicago website because this list has the most comprehensive information
relevant for this study. Some of the debarment lists I searched did not list the reasons for
debarment. Knowing the reason(s) for debarment was crucial for me to objectively
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analyze all relevant information and data I needed to statistically determine the
magnitude of the unknown odds or probabilities of contractors – firms, and individuals
(see the conceptual framework on page 33). Also, I noticed that some government entities
listed few contractors in their debarment lists. A small sample size would be too small for
this study. The strength of this research was enhanced by selecting the City of Chicago’s
Debarment List because it has a considerable sample size and the most comprehensive
information relevant to the study. Therefore, the City’s Debarment List has a high
reputability; it is the official records of contractors sanctioned with debarment by the
City. The Debarment List presents the best source of the dataset for this study.
Data Analysis Plan
I utilized the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS, Version 25) to
conduct the data for analysis. The dataset that I had created in EXCEL Spreadsheet was
downloaded into SPSS software. SPSS is very suitable to analyze the data because the
software was designed to perform several statistical tests and analyses and present
graphical illustrations (Suresh, 2015). I applied binomial logistic regression as the
statistical tool to test the hypothesis and predict answer to the research question of this
study. Binomial logistic regression provides models of the probability of an event
occurring based on the values of the independent variables (Osborne, 2015) and gives
estimates of the probability of an event to occur (Laerd Statistics, 2017). Logistic
regression is used to classify observations by estimating the probability of an observation
in a category (Warner, 2013). Also, I used binomial logistic regression to explore how
well the independent variables predict a categorical outcome (Pedhazur, 1997; Warner,
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2013). The length of debarment is a continuous variable, while all other variables chosen
for the study from the City’s Debarment List are categorical variables, and they were
coded in SPSS. This study’s objective was to explore the cumulative effect of all the
predictor variables together on the odds and probability of the outcome variable being
debarred. I assessed predictor variables individually and collectively, to check their
statistically significant contributions to predicting the dependent variable. Data analyses
included in the study were descriptive statistics, omnibus tests, model summary, and
calculation of odds ratio. Odds ratios measure the direction and strength of an association
(Simeon & Goes, 2013) and can be deduced from the logistic equation. I presented the
relevant tables and charts to report the results of the data analysis.
Logistic Regression Assumptions
I ensured that this study met all the assumptions of logistic regression analysis
based on my study design and measurements, the data fit the binomial logistic regression
model. The assumptions are stated below:
•

The data has a binary dependent variable (Harrell, 2015).

•

The data has more than one independent variable measured at either a
continuous or nominal scale (Harrell, 2015).

•

There is evidence of a dependence of observations among the data and the
categories of the dependent variable, while the nominal independent variables
are mutually exclusive and exhaustive (Harrell, 2015).
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•

There were 138 cases per independent variable, which are more than the
recommended number of 50 cases per independent variables (Menard, 2010;
Tabachnick, & Fidell, 2014).

•

The continuous predictor variable has a linear relationship with the logit
transformation of the outcome. (Box & Tidwell, 1962; Laerd Statistics, 2017).
In this study, the interaction between the length of debarment variable and its
log odds was obtained through Bonferroni procedure to validate this
assumption.

•

The study data did not show multicollinearity; that is, no independent
variables that are highly correlated with each other (Osborne, 2015).

•

There were no significant outliers or highly influential points (Osborne, 2015).
Threats to Validity

Validity is the degree to which a measure evaluates what it purports to measure
(Fink, 2014). I used the binomial logistic regression analysis as the statistical test for this
study to evaluate the level to which the measure forecasts the dependent variable. The
rationale to reduce the threats to the internal and external validity of data adequately was
to ensure meaningful interpretation of data of this study.
Internal Validity
The potential threat to internal validity is the accuracy of statistical regression
analysis. However, to reduce any threat to the internal validity of the test, I assessed the
data and confirmed that it met all the assumptions of a binomial logistic regression to
provide the answer to the research question. These assumptions included the assumptions
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about independence of observations and inclusion of important covariables (Harrell,
2015). The assumption of linearity presupposes a linear relationship between the
continuous independent (length of debarment) and the logit transformation of the
outcome. I validated the assumption of linearity by using Box and Tidwell Test (Box &
Tidwell, 1962), and Benferonni procedure (Laerd Statistics, 2017). The assumption of
goodness of model fit was validated by Hosmer and Lemeshow Test (Hosmer &
Lemeshow, 1989).
External Validity
The potential threat to the external validity of data in the study is the reputability
of the City’s Debarment List because I did not create the data and the City did not
establish the list specifically for this study. However, this threat of internal validity posed
no threat to this study because it is doubtful to have a contractor listed in a debarment list
without due process and official sanction. The Debarment List is the official records of
contractors sanctioned with debarment actions by the City pursuant to Section VII of the
City’s Debarment Rules.
Ethical Procedures
I received approval from the Walden University IRB (Approval no. 07-10-200228450) before collecting data for the study. The Debarment List is a public document,
which the City published on the Internet for public information. The data in the
Debarment List are neither anonymous nor confidential. The data I collected are from
public records, which I used for research purposes only. The data do not contain sensitive
personal information; ethical protections are not serious issues in this study. Therefore, I
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did not need to seek permission from the City to gain access or to obtain the Debarment
List because I analyzed only data that was already available to the public.
Summary
In this chapter, I presented the methods and design that I used to conduct the
study as well as the target population and sampling for the study. I also presented how I
analyzed the preexisting data that cover the City of Chicago’s debarment decisions during
12 Fiscal Years (FY 08 through FY 19). The core of chapter 4 includes study’s research
question, hypothesis, data collection and a detailed analysis of the findings, which was
obtained through the application of both descriptive and inferential statistical techniques.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
The purpose of this quantitative secondary data analysis was to examine the
predictive relationship of the effects of location of contractor, debarment fraud, and
length of debarment on business entities (registered as firms or individuals) that were
debarred from receiving contract awards from a municipal government in the State of
Illinois. Using binomial logistic regression, I analyzed the Debarment List of the City of
Chicago to determine the statistical odds and probability of contractors that may be
debarred from the array of contractors doing business with the City. In this chapter, I
provided the results of binomial logistic regression analysis of the secondary data from
the City of Chicago’s Debarment List I used to test the hypothesis and answer the
research question. I included tables and figures to illustrate the results. Tables and figures
enhance data presentation (Dietz & Kalof, 2009; Durbin, 2014). I also provided details of
descriptive and inferential statistics and a summary of findings in this chapter.
Research Question and Hypotheses
In this study, I addressed the following research question and hypotheses:
What predictive relationship, if any, do a contractor’s location, debarment fraud,
and the length of debarment on contractors listed in the debarment list have as to whether
they were debarred from receiving contracts from the City of Chicago municipal
government in the State of Illinois?
Ho: The debarment fraud of a debarred contractor listed in the debarment list of
the City of Chicago will not be a significant predictor of business entity when compared
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to the contractor’s location and the length of debarment. Ho: µLocation = µFraud =
µLength.
Ha: The debarment fraud of a debarred contractor listed in the debarment list of
the City of Chicago will significantly increase the ability to predict business entity when
compared to the contractor’s location and the length of debarment. Ha: µLocation ≠
µFraud ≠ µLength.
Data Collection
The data I analyzed for this study, which were publicly accessible online, were
preexisting and covered up-to-date City of Chicago’s debarment decisions compiled in
the City’s official Debarment List, pursuant to Section VII of the City’s Debarment
Rules. After I received IRB approval, I analyzed data for 12 fiscal years from the City of
Chicago Debarment List of debarred contractors, which I downloaded from a publicly
accessible document published on the City of Chicago’s website
(https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/dps/DebarredFirms/DebarredList05262
020.pdf). I identified the total universe of the City’s 158 debarment actions for all fiscal
years, but I selected the City’s debarment actions for fiscal years 2008 through 2019 for
this study. Each fiscal year ran in a cycle from July 1 through June 30. For example, FY
2019 was the period July 1, 2018 to June 30, 2019. I was inspired to select 12 fiscal years
because the number “12” is the natural number of months in a year. The data were
screened, cleansed, and transposed into a dataset spreadsheet before I exported it into
SPSS v.25 for analysis. I coded the dichotomous variables of contractor’s location,
debarment fraud, and business entity before I performed the data analysis. There were no
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discrepancies in data collection from the plan presented in Chapter 3. The total number of
debarred contractors extracted for this study was N = 138.
Description of the Study Sample
The debarment data analyzed for this study covered fiscal years 2008 through
2019. The City took the highest debarment action in 2009 (n = 39) but no debarment
action in 2017 (n = 0). The visual displays of the data are represented by frequency
distribution in Table 3 and a bar chart in Figure 7.
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for City of Chicago Debarments From FY08 - FY19
Fiscal year

Frequency

Percent

Valid percent

Cumulative percent

2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Total

8
39
4
37
17
8
1
12
1
0
8
3
138

5.8
28.3
2.9
26.8
12.3
5.8
.7
8.7
.7
0
5.8
2.2
100.0

5.8
28.3
2.9
26.8
12.3
5.8
.7
8.7
.7
0
5.8
2.2
100.0

5.8
34.1
37.0
63.8
76.1
81.9
82.6
91.3
92.0
92.0
97.8
100.0
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Figure 7. Bar chart for the City of Chicago debarments (FY08 - FY19).
Study Results
Baseline Descriptive Statistics
In this study, I examined the predictive capability of the location of contractor,
debarment fraud, and length of debarment in the Debarment List of the City of Chicago
on the functional outcome of the business entities registered to do business with the City,
such as the probability of getting a business entity debarred. I generated descriptive
statistics based on business entity, location of contractor, debarment fraud and length of
debarment to show the characteristics of the debarred contractors, shown in Table 4. The
total number of debarred contractors in the sampled data was N = 138.
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for Business Entity, Location of Contractor, and Debarment Fraud
Variable

Category

Frequency

Percent

Business entity

Individual
Firm

82
56

59.4
40.6

Valid
percent
59.4
40.6

Cumulative
percent
59.4
100.0

Location

Other cities
Chicago

58
80

42.0
58.0

42.0
58.0

42.0
100.0

Debarment fraud

Nonprocurement
fraud
Procurement
fraud

33

23.9

23.9

23.9

105

76.1

76.1

100.0

Among the registered business entities, the City of Chicago debarred more
individuals than firms. Eighty-two contractors who registered as individuals represented
59.4% of contractors debarred by the City, whereas the City debarred 56 contractors who
registered as firms (40.6%). The data showed that 52% (n = 80) of contractors are in the
City of Chicago, whereas 42% (n = 42) are located outside the City of Chicago. A
government debarment lists consists of contractors that are debarred for procurement
fraud and nonprocurement fraud (Levy & Wagner, 2018). In this study, procurementrelated debarments are categorized as procurement frauds while those that are not
procurement related are categorized as nonprocurement fraud. The City recorded 105
(76.1%) procurement frauds and 33 (23.9%) nonprocurement frauds. Fraud in public
procurement manifest in different forms (Caulfield, 2014). For this study, I identified five
subcategories of procurement fraud in the City of Chicago’s debarment list and classified
other debarments that are not procurement related as nonprocurement fraud. The total
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nonprocurement debarments were n = 33. Table 5 indicates the descriptive statistics of
type of frauds identified in the City’s debarment list. The mode is the case with the
largest frequency or percentage in a distribution (Bryman & Bell, 2015; Warner, 2018).
Contract fraud has the highest frequency of 40 and represents the mode in the
distribution, and accounts for 29% of the sampled population. Meanwhile, invoicing
fraud has the least count of 4, which is 2.9%.
Table 5
Descriptive Statistics for Type of Frauds
Types of fraud
Contract
Phony company
Forgery
Set-aside
Invoicing
Nonprocurement

Frequency

Percent

Valid percent

Cumulative
percent

40
15
11
35
4
33

29.0
10.9
8.0
25.4
2.9
23.9

29.0
10.9
8.0
25.4
2.9
23.9

29.0
39.9
47.8
73.2
76.1
100.0

Inferential Statistics
This study was about finding the associations and predictive measures of location
of contractor, debarment fraud and length of debarment regarding debarred contractors. I
utilized binomial logistic regression, α =.05 (two-tailed), to analyze the data having
confirmed that the data in this study met all the assumptions associated with the use of
logistic regression analysis (see Data Analysis Plan in Chapter 3). Logistic regression
analysis was performed in SPSS to assess the significant predictors of the outcome
variable (business entity) from theoretically based variables (location, fraud, and length)
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obtained from the debarment list. The results of inferential statistics are presented in six
steps below to address the hypothesis and the research question.
Step 1. Data coding. SPSS calculated cases and apportioned coding to the
variables. I began the analysis with an inspection of the data to check for any missing
case. This was to ensure that the appropriate cases were reported. Table 6 shows that
cases used in the analysis were N = 138. There was no missing case, suggesting that the
data were suitable for analysis.
Table 6
Case Processing Summary
Unweighted cases
Selected cases

Unselected cases
Total

Included in analysis
Missing cases
Total

N

Present

138
0
138
0
138

100.0
.0
100.0
.0
100.0

Table 7 displays the coding for the dependent variables. The internal SPSS coding
for the variable Firm = 1 and Individual = 0. The main event predicted in this study was
debarment for firm. Debarment for individual was used as the reference category. An
event coded with higher numerical number is predicted by SSPS (Laerd Statistics, 2017).
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Table 7
Dependent Variables Codings
Original value
Individual
Firm

Internal value
0
1

Table 8 is for the Categorical Independent Variable Coding. It shows coding for
the categorical variables and counts for analysis. The categories had good counts, a
situation that is desirable for logistic regression (Osborne, 2015). In the row for
debarment fraud, the number of occurrences (frequency) for procurement fraud category
was n = 105 and coded = 1, whereas the frequency for nonprocurement fraud was n = 33
and coded = 0. The parameter coding = 1 for the n = 80 contractors located in Chicago
City, while the parament coding = 0 for n = 58 contractors that are located across other
cities outside the City of Chicago. I interpreted values coded =1 in this study.
Table 8
Categories Variables Codings
Original value

Frequency

Debarment fraud

Nonprocurement fraud
Procurement fraud

33
105

Parameter
coding (1)
.000
1.000

Location

Other cities
Chicago

58
80

.000
1.000

Step 2. Baseline model analysis. SPSS calculated the baseline model analysis.
Only the constant was added to the model without any predictor variable. Table 9
displays the classification of the predictor variables with no predictor variable added to
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the model. This baseline model suggests an overall “guess” of 59.4% (82/138) percentage
to predict every case that a business entity registered as an individual will be debarred
while only 40.6% (56/138) of contractors registered as firms will be debarred.
Table 9
Classification Table
Predicted
Business entity
Percentage correct
Observed
Step 0 Business entity

Individual
Firm

Individual
82
56

Firm
0
0

100.0
.0
59.4

Overall percentage
Constant is included in the model and the cut value is .500

Table 10 is for Variables in the Equation, which SPSS calculated as “Block 0
Model. This model analysis included only the constant (intercept). I used this baseline
model to compare with another model when all the predictor variables were added (see
Table 16).
Table 10
Variables in the Equation
B
Step 0

Constant -.381

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

.173

4.480

1

.028

.683

The description of parts in Table 10 are below:
B - means Beta, which is the estimated logit coefficient (Warner, 2013).
S.E. - means standard error of the coefficient (Warner, 2013).
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Wald - means the test statistic for each predictor variable in the model (Warner, 2013)
df - means degrees of freedom, which is the number of independent values that a statistic
is based and calculated as (N-1) (Frankfort-Nachmias & Leon-Guerrero, 2018).
Sig. - means the significance level (p-value) of the coefficient (Laerd Statistics, 2017).
Exp(B) - is the exponential of B, which represents the odds ratio of the independent
variable (Laerd Statistics, 2017)
Step 3. Model fit calculated. I used SPPS to calculate the overall statistical
significance of the model to test the hypothesis. Table 11 displays the values for the
Omnibus Test of Model Coefficients. SPSS calculated “Block 1 Model.” The Omnibus
tests predict categories when not compared to independent variables and show how poor
the model can predict the categorical outcomes. The corresponding “Sig.” value to
consider for the Chi-Square of 17.263 with a degree of freedom of 3 is from the row
described as “Model.” This model is a test of the hypotheses stated in Chapter 1. The
result of this model test showed that the chi-square showed strong significance (Chisquare = 17.263, df = 3, p <.001).
All three independent variables collectively proved to be statistically significant to
predict the outcome variable. Therefore, the null hypothesis is hereby rejected while I
accepted the research hypothesis to be true.
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Table 11
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients

Step 1

Step
Block
Model

Chi-square

df

Wald

17.263
17.263
17.263

3
3
3

.001
.001
.001

Table 12 displays the goodness of fit test that indicates the adequacy of the model.
How a logistic regression model tests whether the model is an adequate fit to the data
(Hosmer, Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 2013). The result of Hosmer and Lemeshow test is
not statistically significant as p = 0.448 (> .05). This test result in an evidence that the
model is not a poor fit.
Table 12
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
Step

Chi-square

df

Sig.

1

7.857

8

.448

Step 4. Valence explained. SPSS calculated the summary of how the variation in
the dependent variable is explained by the model. Table 13 provides a summary of the
index of goodness of fit that explains the magnitude of variation in the dependent
variable. -2log likelihood statistic measures how poorly the model predicts outcomes
(Osborne, 2015). A smaller value indicates a better model (Laerd Statistics, 2017). The
R2 explains approximately how much variation in the outcome is explained by the model
(Warner, 2013). Researchers have the option to select Cox & Snell R2 or Nagelkerke R2
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to calculate the explained variation (Warner, 2013). However, I adopted the result of
Nagelkerke R2 because it can calculate values up to 1 unlike Cox & Snell R2. The
(pseudo-R2) suggests that this logistic regression model analysis explains roughly 15.9%
of the variation in the dependent variable.
Table 13
Model Summary
Step

-2 Log likelihood

Cox & Snell R Square

Nagelkerke R Square

1

169.118

.118

.159

The result of the Hosmer-Lemeshow test in Table 14 shows that the closer the
coherence between the observed values and expected probabilities, the better the model
fit (Frees et al., 2014). This model indicates that the model has a good fit.
Table 14
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test Contingency Table

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Business entity = Individual
Observed
Expected
12
12.552
12
12.167
12
9.349
10
7.794
4
6.068
5
6.288
7
6.684
8
7.075
7
6.580
5
7.443

Business entity = Firm
Observed
Expected
2
1.448
2
1.833
2
4.651
4
6.206
7
4.932
7
5.712
7
7.316
7
7.925
7
7.420
11
8.557

Total
14
14
14
14
11
12
14
15
14
16
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Step 5. Category prediction. SPSS calculated the category prediction with the
correct classification from the predictor variables. Table 15 is a classification table with
the predictor variables added to the model. The overall classification rate is now 62.3%
compared to 59.4% in the null model in Table 9. The improvement indicates that the
model has higher predictive strength.
Table 15
Classification Tablea With Predictors Variables added
Predicted

Step 1

Observed
Business entity
Overall percentage

Individual
Firm

Business entity
Individual
Firm
52
30
22
34

Percentage
correct
63.4
60.7
62.3

a. The cut value is .500
This study used a logistic regression to build predictive models as a function of
predictors. The results of characteristics calculated in Table 15 is explained below:
Percentage accuracy in classification (PAC) = 62.3%. There is an improvement
in the overall prediction of the dependent variable because independent variables were
added to the model.
Sensitivity is 60.71%. This is the percentage of occurrences (firms) correctly
predicted and actually observed as firms. It means [34/ (22 + 34)] % = 60.71% of firms
debarred were also predicted by the model to be contractors that registered as firms.

98
Specificity is 63.4%: This is the percentage of nonoccurrences (individuals)
correctly predicted and actually observed as individuals. In this case, the model correctly
predicted [(52/ (52 + 30)] % = 63.41% of contractors debarred were individuals.
The false positive value rate is the percentage of predicted cases which were
incorrectly classified as firms. SPSS calculated it as [100 x (30 ÷ (30 + 34)] = 46.88%.
This is the percentage of predicted debarred firms which are incorrect but actually
observed as individuals.
The false negative rate is the percentage of cases which were incorrectly
classified as individuals. SPSS calculated it as [100 x (22 ÷ (52 + 22)] = 29.73%. This is
the percentage of predicted debarred individuals which are incorrect, but they were
actually observed as firms.
Step 6. Variables in equation. SPSS calculated the primary binomial logistic
regression equation. Table 16 provides the summary of the main logistic regression
model. The Business Entity group code = 1 for Firm, while the code = 0 for Individual.
The “B” (Beta) coefficients are used to predict the probability of a business entity
occurring. The Wald statistic tests statistical significance of each independent variable to
the model and it is calculated under the “Sig” column. The only predictor variable that
was significant in the model is debarment fraud at p = 0.001. That is, Wald = 11.408, p <
.001 was a significant predictor of business entity debarment. The odds ratio for the
predictor variables is indicated as Exp(B). According to Laerd Statistics (2017), odds
ratio is the change in the odds of the even of interest for one-unit change in the
independent variable. The odds ratios were calculated to determine the relative likelihood
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of predictability for business entity debarment. It is the estimated change in odds of
procurement fraud relative to nonprocurement along with a 95% confidence score for the
odds ratio. The model showed that procurement fraud is 6.86 times more likely to cause
debarment of a business entity registered as a firm than nonprocurement fraud (the
study’s reference category).
Table 16
Variables in Equation for Model
95% C.I.
EXP(B)
Variable
Location(1)

B
.345

S.E.
.385

Wald
.805

df
1

Sig
.370

Fraud(1)

1.926

.570

11.408

1

.001

6.860

2.244

20.974

Length

.011

.073

.023

1

.879

1.011

.876

1.167

-2.256

.892

6.392

1

.011

.105

Constant

Exp(B) Lower
1.412 .664

Upper
3.002

Note. Debarment fraud is calculated for procurement fraud relative to nonprocurement
fraud.
Answer to the Research Question
The research question aimed to examine the influence of the predictive effect of
the predictor variables (location of contractor, debarment fraud, and length of debarment)
on the debarment of a business entity at the City of Chicago.
The research question for this study was this: What predictive relationship, if any,
do a contractor’s location, debarment fraud, and the length of debarment on contractors
listed in the debarment list have as to whether they were debarred from receiving contract
awards from the City of Chicago municipal government in the State of Illinois?
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The answer to the research question is expressed by the logistic regression
equation. Mathematically, the equation of a multiple regression model to predict the
value of outcome variable Y using predictor variables X1 to X3 is stated below:
Υ = β0 + β1 𝜒1 + β2 𝜒2 + β3 𝜒3 + 𝑒 ………………………………………………….. (1)
Where, Υ = Predicted probability of the main event, debarment of business entity (Firm)
1-Υ = Predicted probability of other event, business entity (Individual)
𝜒1 = Location of contractor (Chicago)
𝜒2 = Debarment fraud (Procurement Fraud)
𝜒3 = Length of debarment (Length)
β0 = Intercept (Constant)
β1 = Regression coefficient of 𝜒1
β2 = Regression coefficient of 𝜒2
β3 = Regression coefficient of 𝜒3
e = Residual term
The logit transformation gives the following equation:
𝑃(𝑌)

Logit (Υ) = ln (Odds) = 𝑙𝑛 (1−𝑃(𝑌)) = β0 + β1 𝜒1 + β2 𝜒2 + β3 𝜒3 …..………….……. (2)
P = probability of the event occurring, e.g. a Firm getting debarred
Odds Prediction Equation =

𝐸𝑥𝑝(β0 +β1 𝜒1+ β2𝜒2 + β3𝜒3) ……………………………….………………………………..(3)
Covert odds to probabilities as given below
Probability function = P = 𝐸𝑥𝑝(β0 +β1 𝜒1 + β2 𝜒2 + β3 𝜒3 ) / [1 +𝐸𝑥𝑝(β0 +β1 𝜒1 + β2 𝜒2 + β3 𝜒3 ) ] .…....(4)
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Or written as 𝑃 = (

odds

1+odds

) ………………………………………………………… (5)

0<p<1
From (1) above, the final logistic regression equation is given below:
Logit (Firm) = ln (odds) = -2.256 + 0.345𝝌𝑳𝒐𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 + 1.926𝝌𝑭𝒓𝒂𝒖𝒅 + 0.011𝝌𝑳𝒆𝒏𝒈𝒕𝒉
Assuming location of contractor = Chicago (coded as 1), debarment fraud = procurement
fraud (coded as 1), and length of debarment = 1 year, the odds and probability for
procurement fraud to trigger debarment of a firm are calculated below:
a. Recall procurement fraud, coded as “1” to predict business entity (firm)
Ln (Odds) = -2.256 + (0.345*1) + (1.926*1) + (0.011*1) + e = 0.026
Odds (Firm) = Exp (0.026) = 1.03
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠

1.03

Probability (Firm) = 𝑃 = (1+𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠) = (1+1.03) = 0.507 = 50.74%
b. Recall nonprocurement fraud, coded as “0” to predict business entity (firm)
Ln (Odds) = -2.256 + (0.345*1) + (1.926*0) + (0.011*1) + 0 + e = -1.9
Odds (Firm) = Exp (-1.9) = 0.1496
Probability (Firm) = [0.1496/ (1 + 0.1496] = 0.13 = 13%
𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑠.

𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)

= 1.03/0.1496 = 6.86

The odds and probability for procurement fraud to trigger debarment of an
individual contractor are calculated below:
c. Calculating for procurement fraud, coded as “1” to predict business entity
(individual)
Logit (Individual) = 1- Logit (Firm) = (1 - 0.026) = 0.974
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Odds (Individual) = Exp (0.974) = 2.649
Probability (Individual) = [(2.649/ (1+2.649)] = 0.726 = 72.60%
d. Calculating for nonprocurement fraud, coded as “0” to predict business entity
(individual)
Logit (Individual) = 1- Logit (Firm) = (1 + 1.9) = 2.9
Odds (Individual) = Exp (2.9) = 18.74
Probability (Individual) = (18.74/ (1 + 18.74) = 0.9493 = 94.93%
A binomial logistic regression analysis was performed to predict the effect of
location of contractor, debarment fraud, and length of debarment on the business entities
debarred from doing business with the City of Chicago. SPSS was used to perform data
from 138 cases included in this analysis. The data analyzed covered debarment actions at
the City of Chicago for twelve Fiscal Years from FY 08 to FY19. In the outcome
variable, busines entity category, coding for the variable Firm =1 and Individual = 0. The
predictors variables were also coded in the model: for the location of contractor category,
coding for the variable Chicago =1 and Other city = 0, and for debarment fraud category,
the variable procurement fraud = 1 and nonprocurement = 0. Box-Tidwell Test was used
with a Bonferroni correction to show a statistical significance at p < .01 (Tabachnick &
Fidell, 2014). This test assessed that the length of debarment was linearly related to the
logit of the dependent variable. The Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness of fit test showed
an evidence of model fit (Hosmer, Lemeshow, 2000). The result of the binary logistic
regression model analysis showed strong statistical significance, χ2(3) = 11.408, p < .001.
Since the test for significance is at p < .05, debarment fraud was the only predictor
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variable that was statistically significant (see Table 16). The Wald ratio for the other
predictor variables - location of contractor (χ2(3) = 0.805, p < 0.370) and length of
debarment (χ2(3) = 0.023, p < 0.879) did not add significantly to the model. The logistic
regression model analysis explained approximately 15.9% (Nagelkerke R2) of the
variation in the debarred business entities variable and correctly classified 62.3% of
cases. Sensitivity was 60.71%, specificity was 63.41%, the positive predictive value was
53.13%, and the negative predictive value was 70.27%. A procurement fraud had 6.86
times higher odds to get firms debarred compared with a nonprocurement fraud.
I established in this study that only debarment fraud contributed significantly to
the model in Table 17. To determine the debarment fraud effects on the model, I ran a
separate logistic regression specifically for all the fraud types in the variable of
dichotomous debarment fraud and controlled for location of contractor and length of
debarment. The fraud type variables are categorical, with six different frauds. The
dummy code created in SPSS are: Phony company = 1, Forgery = 2, Set-aside = 3,
Invoicing = 4, Nonprocurement = 5, while I selected Contract Fraud as the reference
category. Table 18 is the logistic regression for fraud types. Contract fraud was chosen as
the reference category because it is the type of fraud that recorded the highest debarment
in the sample. The model showed that phony company, forgery, and nonprocurement
frauds are significant. The fraud of using a phony company to do business with the City
is 21.3 times more likely to trigger the debarment of a firm when compared to contract
fraud.
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Table 17
Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of Business Entity debarred based on Location
of Contractor, Debarment Fraud and Length of Debarment.

Variable
Location(1)

B
.345

S.E.
.385

Wald
.805

df
1

p
.370

Odds
ratio
1.412

Fraud(1)

1.926

.570

11.408

1

.001

Length

.011

.073

.023

1

-2.256

.892

6.392

1

Constant

95% C.I. for odds
ratio
Lower
.664

Upper
3.002

6.860

2.244

20.974

.879

1.011

.876

1.167

.011

.105

Note. Predicted probability is of Business Entity for Firm. Statistical significance
threshold = p < .05
Table 18
Logistic Regression for Fraud Types
95% C.I. for
Odds
Odds ratio
ratio Lower Upper
1.328 .570
3.095

Variable
B
S.E. Wald df
p
Location (1)
.284
.432
.432 1 .511
Debarment Fraud
22.507 5 .000
Phony Company
3.058 1.122 7.426 1 .006 21.288 2.360
Forgery
-2.213 1.103 4.026 1 .045
.109
.013
Set-aside
.154
.502
.094 1 .760 1.166 .436
Invoicing
.162 1.083 .022 1 .881 1.176 .141
Nonprocurement -1.823 .628 8.429 1 .004
.162
.047
Length
-.099 .084 1.387 1 .239
.905
.767
Constant
.505
.821
.378 1 .539 1.657
Note. Types of Fraud are compared to Contract fraud (reference category).
Dependent variable = Business Entity (Firm).
Statistical significance threshold = p < .05

192.032
.950
3.116
9.819
.553
1.068
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Summary
In Chapter 4, I showed that by using binomial logistic regression analysis to
analyze the data in the debarment list of the City of Chicago, the predictor variables of
location of contractor, debarment fraud and length of debarment proved to be
significantly effective predicting the likelihood of a business entity that may be debarred
by the City. Table 11 confirmed there was a statistically significant association in the
predictor variables used in the study, χ2(3) = 17.263, p < .001. I rejected the null
hypothesis but accepted the research hypothesis. The debarment fraud was the only
predictor variable that contributed to the significance in the model. I ran a separate
logistic regression analysis to examine the effect of different debarment fraud types on
business entity. The model showed that phony company, forgery and nonprocurement
frauds are significant. The fraud of using a phony company to do business with the City
is 21.3 times more likely to trigger the debarment of a firm when compared to contract
fraud. In Chapter 5, the final chapter of this study, I discussed the interpretation of the
findings, implications, and limitations of the study, and offered policy recommendations
that invite a paradigm for social change.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendation
This study was set out to examine whether the data in the City of Chicago’s
Debarment List can determine the statistical probability of business entities (firms or
individuals) that may be debarred from government contracting in the City. This study
was a nonexperimental quantitative method of secondary data analysis of the Debarment
List of the City of Chicago. Based on the principles of deterrence theory, this study was a
scholarly attempt to produce predictive analytics which public agencies may use to deter
government contractors from committing frauds in public procurement. The result of the
findings showed that there was a statistically significant association in the predictor
variables used in the study.
Interpretation of the Findings
A binomial logistic regression analysis was performed to examine the effect of
location of contractor, debarment fraud, and length of debarment on the likelihood of the
business entity that may be debarred from receiving contract awards from the City of
Chicago. The logistic regression equation showed the following probabilities:
•

A procurement fraud had a 50.74% probability to trigger debarment for a firm.

•

A procurement fraud was 1.03 times more likely to cause debarment for a
firm.

•

A procurement fraud had a 72.60% probability to trigger debarment for an
individual contractor.

•

A nonprocurement fraud has a probability of 13% to trigger debarment for a
firm.
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•

A nonprocurement fraud is 0.15 times more likely to cause debarment for a
firm.

•

A nonprocurement fraud has a probability of 94.93% to trigger debarment of
an individual.

•

The odds of having a firm debarred are 6.86 times higher for procurement
fraud that they are for nonprocurement fraud.

•

The fraud of using a phony company to do business with the City is 21.3 times
more likely to trigger the debarment of a firm when compared to contract
fraud.

The binomial logistic regression model result in this study showed statistical
significance, χ2(3) = 17.263, p < .001. As all other independent variables remain constant
(see Table 17), the coefficients show the change in the log odds that occur for a one-unit
change in an independent variable (Laerd Statistics, 2017). In the case of debarment
fraud, the change in log odds for procurement fraud is 1.926. This value is the increase in
log odds (as B is positive) for debarment fraud related to procurement. Among the three
predictor variables, location (p = 0.370) and length (p = 0.879) did not add significantly
to the model. Only the debarment fraud was statistically significant at p < .001 (see Table
17). This result means that when controlled for location of contractor and the length of
debarment, procurement fraud has a 50.7% probability of triggering debarment for a firm
relative to nonprocurement fraud. Also, procurement fraud has a 72.60% probability of
triggering debarment for an individual contractor relative to nonprocurement fraud. The
interpretation of this result is that a business entity registered to do business with the City
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as an individual was debarred for procurement fraud more than firms. The odds ratio,
which SPSS calculated as the Exp(B) value, is 6.86 for procurement fraud (coded as “1”
under the debarment fraud category). Taking the exponent of the log odds, indicated in the
output as Exp(B), gives the odds ratio, which shows that a one unit increase in a procurement
fraud case increases the odds of getting a firm debarred from City contracts by a
multiplicative factor of 6.86 compared to a nonprocurement case. In other words, t he odds

suggest that if a contractor is chosen at random from the sample, a procurement fraud is
6.86 more likely than a nonprocurement fraud to cause a firm to be debarred. The
confidence interval suggests that the actual difference in odds of firm debarment for
procurement fraud compared with nonprocurement fraud could be as low as 2.25 or as
high as 20.95. In Table 18, the fraud of using a phony company to do business with the
City is 21.3 times more likely to trigger debarment of a firm when compared to contract
fraud. These statistical odds are noteworthy because the City debarred more business
entities for contract fraud (n = 40) than other frauds in the sample under review. This
result means that a business entity that uses a phony company to do business with the
City is certainly a huge risk to its procurement interests. This model result confirms the
City’s policy, which debars a business entity that registered with the City as a firm for a
lifetime if it was determined that the firm has egregiously violated procurement rules
(City of Chicago, 2020). A lifetime sanction means that the City will not allow a
company debarred for lifetime to do business with the City in any circumstances. Overall,
the results in this study are consistent with the findings of many scholars that government
agencies continue to face the risks of contracting with fraudulent or criminal contractors
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(Auriol & Søreide, 2017; McCue et al., 2015; Rendon & Rendon, 2015; WilliamsElegbe, 2019). It was also confirmed by government agencies and multinational
organizations (GAO, 2014; ISCD, 2018; OECD, 2016, The World Bank, 2019).
Research Question and Deterrence Theory and Conceptual Framework
The research question asked for the probability of a business entity that may be
debarred from receiving contract awards from the City of Chicago based on the effect of
contractor’s location, debarment fraud and the length of debarment. In Chapter 2, I
postulated that, in government contracting, the element of debarment deterrence is the
probability of catching a contractor for procurement violations (celerity), probability of
debarment (certainty), and the probability of getting listed in the debarment list (severity).
In accordance with deterrence theory, increasing the probability of being caught increases
the certainty that a contractor will be debarred. It suffices to say that by keeping a
debarment list of those debarred, a government can prevent or reduce the rate of
procurement violations in its jurisdiction. The certainty of being debarred deters a
rational contractor from violating procurement regulations than celerity (Auriol &
Søreide, 2017). Severity in deterrence theory is the strength of a sanction that correlates
with the probability of a high crime cost, which is akin to the debarment length in the
debarment system. Studies on the severity of punishment from legal sanction show that
short to moderate punishment is likely to produce more effective deterrence than longer
punishment (Cerrone et al., 2018; Tanaka & Hayashi, 2016; Tomlinson, 2016).
The evolution of my conceptual framework is displayed in Figure 8. The
emergent probabilities have been added to establish how deterrence theory underpinning

110
debarment deterrence may impact contractor willingness to receive contracts from
government agencies. The logistic regression model predicts the odds and probability that
a case of a given debarment fraud will trigger a firm’s debarment in government
contracting. Since debarment fraud was the only significant variable in the model and
procurement fraud was the event of occurrence in the model, the results showed that
procurement fraud has the odds of 1.03 or probability of 50.74% to cause the City to
debar a business entity registered as a firm from doing procurement business with the
City. Also, procurement fraud has the odds of 2.649 or probability of 72.60% to likely
cause the City to debar a business entity registered as an individual contractor from doing
procurement business with the City.

Figure 8. The debarment deterrence model with probability values.
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These probabilities suggest that procurement fraud has greater chances of
triggering debarment of an individual contractor than a firm relative to nonprocurement
fraud. The conceptual model highlights the probabilities of how procurement fraud can
trigger the debarment of firms and individual contractors differently but equitably. It also
gives an insight into how debarment deterrence of procurement fraud shows better impact
on firms than individual contractors when compared with nonprocurement fraud. The
probability of legal sanction deter fraud greater than the severity of legal sanction (Mann,
Garcia-Rada, Hornuf, & Tafurt, 2016). Procurement fraud is 6.86 times more likely to
cause a firm to be debarred than an individual contractor relative to nonprocurement
fraud. Therefore, this study confirmed that deterrence theory can be used to show that the
probability of reducing a procurement fraud in public procurement can be achieved
through debarment sanction.
Limitations of the Study
I selected the debarment list of the City of Chicago for analysis because the City’s
list has all the data relevant for this study. The limitation to the generalizability of this
study is that a government agency that does not have the type of secondary data I used in
this study may not adapt the design of this study to generalize from the study sample to a
larger population. It is important to generalize research outcomes from a dataset to realworld practice settings (Polit & Beck, 2017). Another limitation in this study was that the
algorithms I built for the dataset that I used in this study were populated by my hand due
to lack of automation. Although this was a major practical constraint during the study, I
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applied a robust study design that did not allow for sampling deficiencies or data quality
problems.
Recommendations
The results of this study provided support for the relationship between location of
contractor, debarment fraud, length of debarment and business entity. A practical
recommendation for practice is that public agencies will need to keep detailed data of all
the variables used in this study to tap into the opportunity to statistically predict certain
contractors that might be involved in different types of procurement fraud. A business
entity registered as an individual faced more debarments for committing procurement
fraud relative to a firm. One recommendation is for the Department of Procurement
Services at the City of Chicago to develop an intelligent policy to scrutinize the
responsiveness and responsibility of individual contractors. The City and other public
agencies need predictive capabilities that may foster the clarity, accountability, and
integrity of its debarment system, to act as the first defense barrier in the quest to prevent
or deter procurement fraud. More academic studies with bigger sample size are
worthwhile to evaluate the innovative idea of utilizing a debarment list to produce the
most statistically probable outcomes. Also, there is a need to address the issues regarding
the application of cognitive technology on the debarment list to produce statistical
predictions. I populated the dataset used in this study by hand due to lack of automation.
However, artificial intelligence (AI) can be used to perform these time-consuming and
laborious tasks at a scale and cost that human beings could not possibly do. Scholars
reported that AI application in procurement will be the next wave of cognitive technology
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that will impact public procurement practices very soon (Muchhala, 2018; Schubmehl et
al., 2018; Zagorin, 2017). Hence, further academic research is imperative to discover how
to apply AI based on data mining, data modeling and machine learning to automate the
debarment list dataset. The ensued predictive analytics should open the need for
government agencies to apply digital transformations in debarment. Otherwise,
government agencies may continue to operate with an inability to gather meaningful data
from a debarment list to perform intelligent data analysis.
Implications
In this study, I framed public debarment fraud as an endemic social problem,
which may not allow the society to function at an optimal level. Predictive applications of
the debarment list imply that procurement in the public sector needs social change for
fraud prevention, public advocacy, and management of public funds. First, this study’s
predictive analytics may strengthen the use of debarment as statutory enforcement to
prevent or curb public procurement frauds. Second, the results of predictive analytics in
this study may empower public advocacy to illuminate the urgency for contractors and
government agencies to mitigate the risks of procurement fraud and push to direct
taxpayers’ money to what it is meant to fund: procurement of goods and services for the
common good of the people. Third, the empirical representation of the relationship
between all the predictor variables and outcome variable can be stated as follows: A
business entity debarred in a government agency is a function of the location of the
contractor, debarment fraud committed and the length of debarment sanction on the
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contractor. Theoretically, a predictive mathematical model for this function can be
represented as:
Logit (Firm) = -2.256 + 0.345𝝌𝑳𝒐𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 + 1.926𝝌𝑭𝒓𝒂𝒖𝒅 + 0.011𝝌𝑳𝒆𝒏𝒈𝒕𝒉
A summary implication of this study was supported by Vollmer and Machholz
(2017). They conducted a survey of Chief Procurement Officers (CPOs) around the globe
and reported that about 83% of procurement leaders who participated in the survey think
AI will revolutionize public procurement practices in no distant future. Therefore, Chief
Procurement Officers and policymakers may utilize the information from this study to
reimagine public procurement with better debarment practices, purchasing decisions, and
prudent public funds management.
Conclusion
I developed the conceptual framework, the DDM, for this study as well as coined
the term “debarment deterrence” for this research. This study has contributed to the body
of knowledge by using deterrence theory to explain debarment sanctions. It has facilitated
the discussions on the conceptual framework underpinning the predictor and outcome
variables examined in this study. To the best of my knowledge, this research is the first
study to examine a government debarment list’s capability to produce statistical
predictions. It has closed the literature gap by presenting a new knowledge about the
critical link between a debarment list’s predictive relevance and the effectiveness of
debarment deterrence on government contractors. The burden of procurement fraud in
public procurement is still and important public policy issue across all the three levels of
government (Williams-Elegbe, 2016). However, based on the deterrence theory, the study
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showed that the ability to deter public procurement fraud might be subject to the
predictive capability of relevant fraud data in a debarment list. Since a debarment action
is not a punishment but a deterrence-oriented policy (Levy & Wagner, 2018; The World
Bank, 2016), this study recommends the pathway for government organizations to
consider data-driven practical deterrent solutions that may effectively prevent
procurement fraud, waste and abuse.
An adverse effect of fraudulent procurement practices is evident in the debarment
sanctions on many unscrupulous contractors. The association of location of contractor,
debarment fraud, and length of debarment can predict business entity that may be
debarred from the City of Chicago and provide support for the research hypothesis. The
logistic regression equation for this study predicts that the odds of getting a firm to be
debarred are 6.86 times higher for procurement frauds than they are for nonprocurement
frauds. Specifically, the model showed the following results: 50.7% procurement fraud
will trigger debarment for a firm, 72.60% Procurement fraud will trigger debarment for
an individual contractor, 13% of nonprocurement fraud will trigger debarment for a firm
and 94.93% of nonprocurement fraud will trigger debarment of an individual contractor.
Furthermore, a contractor using a phony company to do business with the City is 21.3
times more likely to cause debarment of a firm relative to contract fraud. The statistical
predictions should open the need to apply AI in debarment practices. ServiceNow (n. d.)
found that 77% of government procurement managers expect AI deployment would
reduce workload of complex public procurement tasks. As shown in this study, the use of
the predictive applications of debarment list by government organizations should
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predicate on the supposition that government contractors may not engage in best business
practices to do business with the government responsibly. Predictive applications of
debarment list can create the appropriate balance of risk between the government
contractors and the agencies to mitigate fraud and avoid unnecessary expenditures of
public funds. This statistical transformation may allow government agencies to plan for
the most statistically probable outcomes with confidence scores based on information
gathered from historical debarment data.
Finally, the City of Chicago and other public agencies may use the information in
this research as a reform guidepost that may elevate the debarment list’s predictive
capabilities in their debarment programs.
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Appendix: Debarred City of Chicago Firms and Individuals
ENTITY/INDIVIDUAL
James M. Duff
135 Post Road
Burr Ridge, IL 60527

DEBARMENT
DATE

LENGTH OF
DEBARMENT

REASON

Lifetime

Criminal convictions on various counts
including fraud related to the MWBE
program.

Lifetime

Criminal convictions on various counts
including fraud related to the MWBE
program.

Lifetime

Criminal convictions on various counts
including fraud related to the MWBE
program.

3/21/2008

Permanent

Company used by James M. Duff to commit
MWBE program fraud.

Remedial Environmental
3/21/2008
Manpower, Inc.

Permanent

Company used by James M. Duff to commit
MWBE program fraud.

Windy City Maintenance,
Inc.
3/21/2008

Permanent

Company used by James M. Duff to commit
MWBE program fraud.

3/21/2008

Permanent

Company used by James M. Duff to commit
MWBE program fraud.

American Management
and Consulting Services
3/21/2008
Inc.

Permanent

Company used by James M. Duff to commit
MWBE program fraud.

William E. Stratton
4923 S. Princeton Ave
Chicago, IL 60609

3/21/2008

3/21/2008

Terrence Dolan
325 N. County Line Road
3/21/2008
Hinsdale, IL 60521
Windy City Labor
Services Inc.

Curtis Storage &
Trucking Co.

Elliott Trucking, Inc.

12/17/2008

Permanent

Company used by Martin McDonagh to
commit fraud.

Martin McDonagh

12/17/2008

Lifetime

Criminal fraud conviction.

Garfield Trucking, Inc.

12/17/2008

Permanent

Company used by Charles Romano and
Richard Rylewicz to commit fraud.

Charles Romano
6952 North Oriole Ave.
Chicago, IL 60631

12/17/2008

Lifetime

Criminal fraud conviction.

Richard Rylewicz
6732 West Cermak Rd.
Berwyn, IL 60402

12/17/2008

Lifetime

Criminal fraud conviction.
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R&V Trucking, LLC

12/17/2008

Permanent

Company used by Robert Mangiamele to
commit fraud.

Robert Mangiamele
532 Lois Ct.
Mount Prospect, IL
60056

12/17/2008

Lifetime

Criminal fraud conviction.

Sarch Hauling, Ltd.

12/17/2008

Permanent

Company used by Salvador Alvarez to
commit fraud.

Salvador Alvarez
6951 S. Bell Ave.
Chicago, IL 60636

12/17/2008

Lifetime

Criminal fraud conviction.

Patricia Trucking

12/17/2008

Permanent

Company used by Patricia Fasula to commit
MWBE program fraud.

Patricia Fasula
3826 S. Lowe Ave.
Chicago, IL 60609

12/17/2008

Lifetime

Falsified MWBE certification documents.

Pitts Transportation, Inc. 12/17/2008

Permanent

Company used by Richard Pitts to commit
fraud.

Richard Pitts
2518 East Creekwood Ct.
Crete, IL 60417
12/17/2008

Lifetime

Falsified documents in seeking to obtain City
contract.

GNA Trucking, Inc.

2/17/2009

Permanent

Company used by John Canatello to commit
fraud.

John Cannatello
8201 W. 118th St.
Palos Park, IL 60464

3/19/2009

Lifetime

Criminal fraud conviction.

American Tank, Inc.

2/24/2009

Permanent

Company used by Michael Leyden and
Timothy Schrader to commit fraud.

Michael Leyden
6604 N. Sioux Ave.
Chicago, IL 60646

6/25/2009

Lifetime

Committed fraud.

Timothy Shrader
6604 N. Sioux Ave.
Chicago, IL 60646

6/25/2009

Lifetime

Criminal fraud conviction.

Ignoffo Trucking, Inc.

2/24/2009

Permanent

Company used by Joseph Ignoffo to commit
fraud.

6/25/2009
Joseph Ignoffo
25390 Columbia Bay Dr.
Lake Villa, IL 60046

Lifetime
Criminal fraud conviction.
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LR&C Truck Line, Inc.
2/24/2009

Permanent

Company used by Leroy Peters to commit
fraud.

Commelie Peters
9230 South Racine
Chicago, IL 60620

6/25/2009

Lifetime

Perjury conviction.

Leroy Peters
1232 E. Bemes Rd.
Crete, IL 60417

6/25/2009

Lifetime

Criminal fraud conviction.

Victory Transport, Inc.

2/24/2009

Permanent

Company used by Terrance Williams to
commit forgery.

Terrance Williams
10436 South Maryland
Chicago, IL 60628

6/25/2009

Lifetime

Committed forgery.

BCI Commercial
Roofing, Inc.

3/6/2009

Permanent

Company used by Christopher G. Kelly to
commit fraud.

CGK Consulting, Inc.

3/6/2009

Permanent

Company used by Christopher G. Kelly to
commit fraud.

Cayla Trucking, Inc.

3/11/2009

Permanent

Company used by Debra Coveliers and
Richard Coveliers to commit fraud.

Richard Coveliers
5835 West Higgins
Chicago, IL 60630

3/19/2009

Lifetime

Criminal fraud conviction.

Debra Coveliers
5835 West Higgins
Chicago, IL 60630

3/19/2009

Lifetime

Criminal fraud conviction.

FRC Trucking, Inc.

3/11/2009

Permanent

Company used by Frank Canatello to commit
fraud.

Frank Cannatello
2947 South Halsted St.
Chicago, IL 60630

3/19/2009

Lifetime

Criminal fraud conviction.

Lightner Services, Inc.

3/11/2009

Permanent

Company used by Vincent Hinton to commit
MWBE program fraud.

Vincent Hinton
4707 West Erie
Chicago, IL 60644

6/25/2009

Lifetime

Submitted fraudulant MBE certification
documents.

A. Affetto Trucking, Inc. 3/19/2009
Anthony Affetto
2143 N. Narragansett
Chicago, IL 60639

6/25/2009

Permanent

Company used by Anthony Affetto to commit
fraud.

Lifetime

Criminal fraud conviction.
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John J. Leahy
26107 Oakcrest Ln.
Plainfield, IL 60585

3/19/2009

Lifetime

Criminal fraud conviction.

Edward Wisniewski
7118 W. Main St.
Niles, IL 60714

6/25/2009

Lifetime

Criminal fraud conviction.

James H. Levin
5440 Touhy Ave.
Skokie, IL 60077

3/19/2009

Lifetime

Criminal fraud conviction.

Get Plowed, Inc.

10/28/2009

Permanent

Company used by Michael Jones to commit
fraud.

Michael Jones
5701 S. Sayre Ave.
Chicago, IL 60638

6/25/2009

Lifetime

Criminal fraud conviction.

James Picardi
2726 Moraine Valley Rd.
Wauconda, IL 60084
6/25/2009

Lifetime

Criminal fraud conviction.

Urban Services of
America

6/4/2010

Permanent

Criminal fraud conviction.

Douglas E. Ritter

6/4/2010

Lifetime

Criminal fraud conviction.

Steven Fenzl
33 Marisol
Newport Coast, CA
92657

9/29/2010

Lifetime

Criminal fraud conviction.

Milton A. Curry
6014 S. Racine Avenue
Chicago, IL 60636
10/25/2010

Lifetime

Financial irregularities; refused to cooperate
with IGO investigation.

Fannie Weinshenker
a/k/a Fannie Gasparik
5924 West 107th Place
Chicago Ridge, IL 60415 11/23/2010

Lifetime

Orchestrated scheme to defraud City.

Permanent

Submitted fraudulent invoices to the City and
delivered materials in amounts smaller than
the invoiced amounts.

Lifetime

Submitted fraudulent invoices to the City and
delivered materials in amounts smaller than
the invoiced amounts.

KAR-DON, Inc. d/b/a
Arrow Lumber Company
5820 S. Ashland Avenue
Chicago, IL 60636
12/1/2010

Donald L. Beal
5820 S. Ashland Avenue
Chicago, IL 60636
12/15/2010
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Stephan Smith
6413 Foggy Hills Way
Clifton, VA 20124

12/9/2010

Divine Enterprises, Inc.
a/k/a Divine Equipment
Leasing, Inc.
25W705 Harrison
Wheaton, IL 60187
12/9/2010

Lifetime

Oversaw approval of additional work outside
of the scope of contract and without City
authorization for performance of extra work.

Permanent

Deceptive documentation related to WBE
certification.

Annette Redmond
25W705 Harrison
Wheaton, IL 60187

12/9/2010

Lifetime

Deceptive documentation related to WBE
certification.

Nancy Jacob
25W705 Harrison
Wheaton, IL 60187

12/9/2010

Lifetime

Deceptive documentation related to WBE
certification.

Lifetime

Guilty Plea on criminal indictment for
fraudulently claiming to be a legitimate
M/WBE business and acting as a passthrough for other companies.

Permanent

Fraudulently claimed to be a legitimate
M/WBE business and acted as a passthrough for other companies.

Lifetime

Made false statements to Inspector General’s
Office Investigators in connection with
investigation.

Permanent

Performed construction work as unlicensed
contractor; made false statements to
Inspector General’s Office Investigators.

Lifetime

Falsified invoices submitted to the City for
payment; Fabricated false documentation to
mislead auditors from Compliance. Directed
a witness to lie to IGO investigators.

Centro Familiar La Gran
Esperanza f/k/a Great
Hope Family Center
2622 West Cermak
Chicago, IL 60608
12/16/2010

Permanent

Falsified a reimbursement voucher and
submitted it to the City for payment;
Fabricated false documentation to mislead
auditors from Compliance.

Carl Easter
3935 West Fullerton Ave.
Chicago, IL 60647
1/5/2011

Lifetime

M/WBE program fraud.

Aurora Venegas
4500 S. Kolin Ave.
Chicago, IL 60632
Azteca Supply Co.
4500 S. Kolin Ave.
Chicago, IL 60632
Polibio Cabrera
1932 N. Tripp Ave., #1
Chicago, IL 60639

Cabrera Construction
1932 N. Tripp Ave., #1
Chicago, IL 60639

Isaias Gonzalez
2622 West Cermak
Chicago, IL 60608

12/13/2010

12/13/2010

12/16/2010

12/16/2010

12/16/2010
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Logan Square Pest
Control
3935 West Fullerton Ave.
Chicago, IL 60647
1/5/2011
Rochelle Knox
2733 Lake Park Drive
Lynwood, IL 60411
Changing Patterns for
Families, Inc.
5912 S. State Street
Chicago, IL 60621

Kristi Contreras

1/20/2011

1/20/2011

2/7/2011

Cornerstone
2/7/2011
Construction Services,
Inc.
330 S. Naperville Road,
Suite 401
Wheaton, Illinois 60187

Permanent

M/WBE program fraud.

Lifetime

Submitted false documents in connection
with City contracts; Submitted fraudulent
reimbursement claims to the City.

Permanent

Submitted false documents in connection
with City contracts; Submitted fraudulent
reimbursement claims to the City.

Lifetime

Owner of Cornerstone Construction
Services, Inc. Engaged in MWBE Program
Fraud.

Permanent

Engaged in MWBE Program Fraud.

Danton Fielder
139 West 107th Street
Chicago, IL 60628

3/31/2011

Lifetime

Engaged in MWBE Program Fraud.

D & S Midwest
Construction
139 West 107th Street
Chicago, IL 60628

3/31/2011

Permanent

Engaged in MWBE Program Fraud.

Joseph Depa

4/20/2011

Lifetime

Approved additional work outside of the
scope of contract and without authorization
from the City.

Nat L. Hyman
727 N. Meadow St.
Allentown, PA 18102

5/18/2011

Lifetime

Failed to cooperate with IGO investigation.

Lifetime

Misrepresentations regarding Ms. LaSilva’s
role and ownership interest in Lupita
Contractors, Inc.

Permanent

Misrepresentations regarding Ms. LaSilva’s
role and ownership interest in Lupita
Contractors, Inc.

Lifetime

MWBE program fraud.

Doris Moran LaSilva
1851 W. Grand Ave.
Chicago, IL 60622

5/24/2011

Lupita Contractors, Inc.
1851 W. Grand Ave.
Chicago, IL 60622
5/24/2011
Anna Easter
1316 N. Pulaski Road
Chicago, IL 60651

6/27/2011
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N & L Pest Control
1316 N. Pulaski Road
Chicago, IL 60651

6/27/2011

Permanent

MWBE program fraud.

Corren Evans
3335 S. Cottage Grove
Chicago, IL 60653

7/13/2011

Lifetime

Criminal indictment for theft from City
delegate agency.

Janice Nattee
5003 N. Ashland
Unit 1 E
Chicago, IL 60640

7/29/2011

Lifetime

Submitted false documents to the City.

Permanent

Submitted false documents to the City.

Lifetime

By agreement.

Lifetime

Fraudulently claimed to operate a legitimate
M/WBE business and acted as a passthrough for another company.

Permanent

Fraudulently claimed to be a legitimate
M/WBE business and acted as a passthrough for another company.

The Stuff Toy Childrens
Museum
5003 N. Ashland
Unit 1 E
Chicago, IL 60640
7/29/2011
Barry L. Fischer, MD
1530 N. Ashland
River Forest, IL 60305
Finis Collier, Jr.
3309 W. Van Buren
Chicago, IL 60624

8/12/2011

8/29/2011

FCJ Real Estate
Development Company,
Inc.
3309 W. Van Buren
Chicago, IL 60624
8/29/2011
Earlene Heyden
2314 Windsor Lane
Country Club Hills, IL
60478

9/28/2011

Lifetime

Submitted false documents to the City.

Yong S. Yang
632 Executive Drive
Willowbrook, IL 60527

2/9/2012

Lifetime

Workers compensation insurance fraud
relating to City contracts.

Nationwide Janitorial
Corporation
632 Executive Drive
Willowbrook, IL 60527

2/9/2012

Permanent

Workers compensation insurance fraud
relating to City contracts.

Jimmie Acevedo
419 E. Clark Street
Crown Point, IN 46307

5/16/2012

Lifetime

M/WBE Program fraud.

Anthony McMahon
301 N. Prospect
Park Ridge, IL 60068

8/20/2012

Lifetime

False Statements. M/WBE program fraud.
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John McMahon
6090 N. Kirkwood
Chicago, IL 60646

8/20/2012

Lifetime

False Statements. M/WBE program fraud.

Kathleen McMahon
301 N. Prospect
Park Ridge, IL 60068

8/20/2012

Lifetime

False Statements. M/WBE program fraud.

Nancy McMahon
6090 N. Kirkwood
Chicago, IL 60646

8/20/2012

Lifetime

False Statements. M/WBE program fraud.

Windy City Electric
Company
7225 West Touhy
Chicago, IL 60631

8/20/2012

Permanent

False Statements. M/WBE program fraud.

James J. McHale
5400 N. Northwest
Highway
Chicago, IL 60630

9/11/2012

Lifetime

Imputation of False Statements and
Documents.

Tom Kamykowski
2652 N. Mango Ave.
Chicago, IL 60639

9/11/2012

Lifetime

False Statements and Documents.

12/21/2010

Lifetime

M/WBE program fraud.

10/1/2014

Lifetime

Debarment by another government agency.

MPI, Inc. d/b/a
Management Planning
Institute, Inc.
11070 S. Western Ave.
Chicago, IL 60643

10/1/2014

Permanent

Debarment by another government agency.

Diversified Behavioral
Services, Inc.
11070 S. Western Ave.
Chicago, IL 60643

10/1/2014

Permanent

Debarment by another government agency.

Institute for Positive
Child and Family
Development, Inc.
11070 S. Western Ave.
Chicago, IL 60643

10/1/2014

Permanent

Debarment by another government agency.

Thomas Masen
2755 Ginger Woods
Drive
Aurora, IL 60502
Dr. George E. Smith
11070 S. Western Ave.
Chicago, IL 60643
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Ed’s Investment
Management--Real
Estate, Inc.
11070 S. Western Ave.
Chicago, IL 60643

10/1/2014

Permanent

Debarment by another government agency.

10/1/2014

Permanent

Debarment by another government agency.

Brian Mullins
18462 Dixie Highway
Homewood, IL 60430

12/3/2014

Lifetime

False Statements and Documents.

Josip Beslic 3032
S. Princeton Ave.
Chicago, IL 60616

5/20/2015

Lifetime

False Statements and Documents.

Anthony Blum 8023
Nature Creek Court
10/7/2015
Frankfort, IL 60423

Lifetime

M/WBE program fraud.

DBCC Organization
11070 S. Western Ave.
Chicago, IL 60643

Loretta Dicke

10/20/2016

Lifetime

M/WBE Program fraud.

Leticia Davis

10/24/2017

24 months

False Statement/Representation

Norvetta Landon
5621 S. Ashland Ave.
Chicago, IL 60636

4/2/2018

Lifetime

Failure to cooperate with IG

Indelible Impressions
Construction, Inc.
5621 S. Ashland Ave.
Chicago, IL 60636

4/2/2018

Lifetime

Failure to cooperate with IG

South Chicago Chamber
of Commerce
8948 S. Commercial Ave.
Chicago, IL 60617
2/1/2019

Lifetime

Committed Fraud

Daniel Lira
8948 S. Commercial Ave.
Chicago, IL 60617
2/1/2019

Lifetime

Committed Fraud

Branko Vardijan
221 North Washtenaw
Ave. Chicago, IL 60612

5/7/2020

Lifetime

Attempted to perpetrate fraud on the City.

Ravenswood Disposal
Service,
Inc.
221 North Washtenaw
Ave. Chicago, IL 60612

5/7/2020

Lifetime

Attempted to perpetrate fraud on the City.
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ENTITY/INDIVIDUAL
ML Group, LLC
1507 E. 53rd Street
Unit 807
Chicago, IL 60615

DATE OF INTERIM
RESTRICTIONS

12/18/2012

REASON
The Illinois Department of Transportation
issued a Notice of Suspension and Interim
Suspension of ML Group.

LIST OF FIRMS AND INDIVIDUALS INELIGIBLE TO DO
BUSINESS WITH THE CITY OF CHICAGO
PURSUANT TO CHICAGO MUNICIPAL
ENTITY/INDIVIDUAL
Central Auto Body
3548 W. North Avenue
Chicago, IL 60647

DATE OF CONVICTION/

REASON

5/21/1981

Owner of Central Auto Body pled guilty to,
and was convicted of, charges involving
fraud in relation to a City of Chicago contract.

John Szybkowski
3548 W. North Avenue
Chicago, IL 60647

5/21/1981

Pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of,
charges involving fraud in relation to a City of
Chicago contract.

Jesse Brunt
1220 E. 75th
Chicago, IL 60619

1/6/2011

Indicted on charges involving fraud in relation
to a City of Chicago contract.

Brunt Brothers Transfer
1220 E. 75th
Chicago, IL 60619

1/6/2011

Indicted on charges involving fraud in relation
to a City of Chicago contract.

Anthony Duffy

2/24/2012

Pled guilty to charges involving fraud in
relation to a City of Chicago contract.

Municipal Sewer
Services

1/6/2011

Indicted on charges involving fraud in relation
to a City of Chicago contract.

7/7/2009

Pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of,
charges involving fraud in relation to a City of
Chicago contract.

7/7/2009

Pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of,
charges involving fraud in relation to a City of
Chicago contract.

3/8/2011

Pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of,
charges involving fraud in relation to a City of
Chicago contract.

Manu Shah
1510 Midwest Club
Oak Brook, IL 60523
Shah Engineering, Inc.
1510 Midwest Club
Oak Brook, IL 60523
Robert C. Blum
3062 W. 167th Street
Markham, IL 60426
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Castle Construction
Corp.
3062 W. 167th Street
Markham, IL 60426

3/8/2011

Pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of,
charges involving fraud in relation to a City of
Chicago contract.

U.S. Occupational
Health, Inc.

3/28/2011

Pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of,
charges involving fraud in relation to a City of
Chicago contract.

ICS Cable, Inc.

4/29/2011

Indicted on charges involving fraud in relation
to a City of Chicago contract.

Guy Potter
459 McCracken Pike
Versailles, KY 40383

4/29/2011

Indicted on charges involving fraud in relation
to a City of Chicago contract.

Jerone Brown
5012 W. Gladys Ave.
Chicago, IL 60644

4/29/2011

Pleaded guilty to charges involving fraud in
relation to a City of Chicago contract.

Matthew Giovenco
844 Fieldale Lane
Grayslake, IL 60030

4/29/2011

Indicted on charges involving fraud in relation
to a City of Chicago contract.

Cheronne Mayes
5012 W. Gladys Ave.
Chicago, IL 60644

4/29/2011

Pleaded guilty to charges involving fraud in
relation to a City of Chicago contract.

4/29/2011

Controlling Person, Cheronne Mayes,
pleaded guilty to charges involving fraud in
relation to a City of Chicago contract.

8/26/2010

Pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of,
charges involving bribery in relation to a City
of Chicago contract.

Leon Moore
5121 N. Marmora Avenue
Chicago, IL 60630

7/28/2011

Admitted to accepting money to influence his
official duties while employed by the City of
Chicago.

Elizabeth Perino
10924 W. 167th Street
Orland Park, IL 60462

2/14/2012

Indicted on charges involving fraud in relation
to a City of Chicago contract.

Perdel Contracting
Corporation
10924 W. 167th Street
Orland Park, IL 60462

2/14/2012

Indicted on charges involving fraud in relation
to a City of Chicago contract.

C.M.M. Cable Co., Inc.
5012 W. Gladys Ave.
Chicago, IL 60644
Wafeek Aiyash
3756 Monarch Circle
Naperville, IL 60564
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Accurate Steel Installers,
Inc.
14631 S. New Avenue
Lockport, IL 60441

2/14/2012

Indicted on charges involving fraud in relation
to a City of Chicago contract.

Anthony Cappello
3539 East 118th Street
Chicago, IL60617

2/14/2012

Pleaded guilty to charges involving fraud in
relation to a City of Chicago contract.

Diamond Coring
Company, Inc.
11800 S. Ewing Ave.
Chicago, IL 60617

2/14/2012

Indicted on charges involving fraud in relation
to a City of Chicago contract.

The Stealth Group a/k/a
SGI, Inc.
11800 S. Ewing Ave.
Chicago, IL 60617

2/14/2012

Indicted on charges involving fraud in relation
to a City of Chicago contract.

David Johnson

4/11/2008

Pleaded guilty to the offense of bribery.

John Bills
10205 S. Springfield Ave,
Chicago, IL 60655

5/15/2014

Indicted on charges involving fraud against
the City of Chicago.

Paul Simmons
3326 Ridge Road
Lansing, IL 60438

5/14/2015

Charged for felony theft committed against
Chicago Public Schools.

Americopy
3326 Ridge Road
Lansing, IL 60438

5/14/2015

Controlling person charged for felony theft
committed against Chicago Public Schools.

Timothy Mason
26092 Cresta Verde
Mission Viejo, CA 92691

3/3/2015

Indicted on charges involving fraud against
the City of Chicago.

Mariana Gerzanych
26092 Cresta Verde
Mission Viejo, CA 92691

3/3/2015

Indicted on charges involving fraud against
the City of Chicago.

Clyde Williams 7
Chicago Avenue
Oak Park, IL 60302

12/26/2017

Charges involving theft against the City of
Chicago.

PJ’s Ace Hardware, Inc.
7 Chicago Avenue
Oak Park, IL 60302

12/26/2017

Charges involving theft against the City of
Chicago.

Kurt Koziol

1/17/2018

Charges involving theft against the City of
Chicago.

156
Koziol Car Wash, Inc.

1/17/2018

Charges involving theft against the City of
Chicago.

John Balzano
349 W. 31st Street
Chicago, IL 60616

3/9/2018

Charges involving theft against the City of
Chicago.

Natalie M. Balzano
349 W. 31st Street
Chicago, IL 60616
J & J Soft Cloth Car
Wash
349 W. 31st Street
Chicago, IL 60616

3/9/2018

Charges involving theft against the City of
Chicago.

3/9/2018

Charges involving theft against the City of
Chicago.

John McClendon
7200 S. Exchange Suite
A
PO Box 490050
Chicago, IL 60649

4/15/2019

Indicted on charges involving fraud in relation
to a City of Chicago contract.

McClendon Holdings
& Affiliates
7200
S. Exchange Suite A
PO Box 490050
Chicago, IL 60649

4/15/2018

Indicted on charges involving fraud in relation
to a City of Chicago contract.

Lester Coleman
7258 S. Halsted St.
Chicago, IL 60621

3/20/2020

Indicted on charges involving fraud in relation
to Chicago Housing Authority contracts.

Coleman Development
Corporation
7258 S. Halsted St.
Chicago, IL 60621

3/20/2020

Indicted on charges involving fraud in relation
to Chicago Housing Authority contracts.

